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Citizen Discontent in the European Union: A General Phenomenon? 
 
The European Union (EU) through a series of treaties has gradually deepened its 
institutional powers within member states and widened its membership to 27. These 
changes were largely pushed forward by political elites relying on permissive consensus. 
Failed referenda on treaties and declining general support (beginning in 1993 with the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht) expose growing public discontent. Previous 
studies claim that when citizens voted against the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe and the substantively similar Treaty of Lisbon, they did so based not on 
opposition to the treaties themselves but to something else. Through evaluation of all 27 
member states, I reveal that discontent is highest on the question of enlargement. 
Conclusions in the literature on what explains this opposition are also mixed. Replicating 
a study conducted by Gabel (1998), I compare the many integration support theories 
existing in the literature. Using survey responses from Eurobarometers and the European 
Values Study I establish that citizens are not homogeneous in what determines their 
views toward enlargement. Attitudes of individuals in original member states are 
influenced by their level of trust in governmental organizations. Members of the first 
enlargement base their opinion on the degree of Europeanization of their self-identity. 
And citizens from the most recent enlargements consider the EU in terms of their 
attitudes toward national governments. 
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GLOSSARY 
Charter of Rights 
Guarantees fundamental human rights to member state 
citizens. Adopted by the Nice Treaty in December 2000. 
Elevated to the same legal status as EU treaties by the 
Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009.  
Convention on the 
Future of Europe 
Set up at Laeken in December 2001. Composed of 105 
members representing member state governments, national 
parliaments, the European Parliament and the European 
Commission. Presided over by Valéry Giscard d‟Estaing. 
Drafts the Constitution and presents it to the European 
Council in June 2003. 
Council of Ministers 
Renamed from Council of the EU by the ToL, commonly 
referred to as “the Council.” Composed of representative 
Ministers from every member state. 
European Central Bank 
(ECB) 
Manages the Euro and the Eurozone members‟ monetary 
policy. President is elected by the European Council. 
Presidents and CEOs of each of the central banks of the 17 
Eurozone members sit on the board of the ECB. National 
banks execute decisions by the ECB. 
European Commission 
Consists of one representative from each of the 27 member 
states. Member governments nominate commissioners and 
they are approved by the EP. Serves as the executive body 
of the EU by administering and implementing EU policies 
and drafts proposals for new EU laws. 
European Council (EC) 
Composed of heads of state or government from each 
member state. Originally established in 1974 and made 
official by the SEA. Meets formally twice every six months 
in Brussels, for two days and is responsible for general 
policy making and treaty changes of the European Union. 
Treaty changes in the EC are adopted by unanimous 
voting. The ToL changed the EC‟s presidency from a 
rotating 6 month term to a permanent 2 ½ year term, 
renewable once. 
European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) 
Responsible for dispute settlement between members, with 




Established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Composed of 
the original six member states: Belgium, Germany, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Builds on the 
European Coal and Steel Community moving from a 
common market in coal and steel to a wider range of goods 
and services. Customs duties between members are 
removed and common agriculture and trade policies are 
established. Denmark, Ireland, and the UK join in 1973. 
  ix 
   
European External 
Action Service (EEAS) 
Established by the ToL as responsible for development and 
foreign aid. Represented by the High Representative of 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Works in 
collaboration with member state diplomatic services. 
European Monetary 
Union (EMU) 
Negotiations began in 1988 for an economic and monetary 
union for all EU member states. Establishes the European 
Central Bank and provisions for monetary policy 
coordination with national central banks. Provisions are 
incorporated into the Treaty on European Union and were 
signed in Maastricht in 1992. 
European Parliament 
(EP) 
Established in 1979, consists of 736 members directly 
elected every five years by EU citizens. Is responsible for 
approval of legislation proposed by the European 
Commission. 
European Union (EU) 
Composed of 27 member states. Originated in 1951with 
the European Coal and Steel Community and has evolved 
through a series of treaties to culminate now with the 
Treaty of Lisbon. 
Eurozone 
Consists of those member states that have signed the EMU 
and have adopted the Euro (single currency implemented 
by the ECB). Currently comprises 17 members. 
High Representative of 
Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR) 
Originally conceived in the Treaty of Amsterdam, replaced 
the High Representative of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and given greater executive power by the 
ToL in 2009. Is responsible for maintaining consistency 
and coherence in EU foreign and defense policy and 
representing the EU in all matters of foreign affairs and 
development. Assisted by the EEAS. 
Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) 
Procedure for the adoption of new treaties of the EU or the 
negotiation of existing ones. IGCs are called by the 
European Council and attended by representatives of each 
member state as well as the Commission and the EP. 
Ratification 
Process through which EU treaties are adopted by national 
parliaments. In general ratification requires majority votes 
by mainstream political parties in national parliaments; 
occasionally ratification will take the form of either 
consultative or binding referenda (depending on national 
constitutional requirements). 
  x 
   
Schengen Agreement 
Originally signed in 1985. Establishes the free movement 
of people across EU member states (within the so-called 
Schengen area) and characterized by greater police and 
judicial cooperation and common visa and asylum policy. 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Romania are not currently fully 
integrated into the Schengen area. The UK and Ireland 
currently have not signed on to all aspects of Schengen. 
Non-EU members who have also signed onto the 
Agreement are Norway and Switzerland. 
Single European Act 
(SEA) 
Signed in 1986 by 12 member states to create a single 
European market which provides for the free movement of 
goods, services, capital, and labor (the four freedoms). 
Entered into force in 1987. 
Treaty of Rome: 
Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic 
Community (TEEC) 
Signed in 1957, formally named the Treaty Establishing 
the European Economic Community (TEEC). Builds on the 
existing common market in coal and steel by expanding to 
include a wider range of goods and services. Eliminates 
customs duties and implements common agricultural and 
trade policies across member states. 
Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe 
(TCE) 
Also referred to as the Constitutional Treaty. Intended to 
replace all existing EU treaties and simplify EU legislation. 
Rejected in referenda in Netherlands and France and set 
aside in 2005. 
Treaty of Amsterdam 
Signed in 1997, entry into force in 1999. Incorporates the 
Schengen Agreement into treaty, making it EU law. 
Increases number of policy areas under qualified majority 
voting. Creates position of High Representative for 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, later replaced in the 
ToL and given additional power through the EEAS. First 
use of flexible integration, where it becomes possible for 
member states to opt out of certain treaty provisions. 
Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) 
Also referred to as the Reform Treaty. Signed in 2007, 
entry into force in 2009. Amends existing EU treaties to 
the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the Union, and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Institutional changes of the ToL resemble those of 
the TCE yet constitutional and legal terminology has been 
removed. “Laws” and “Framework Laws” are replaced by 
“regulations” and “directives.” No EU symbols are 
included in this treaty, hence the removal of reference to 
the EU flag and anthem. 
  xi 
   
Treaty of Maastricht: 
Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) 
Popularly known as the Maastricht Treaty. Signed in 1992 
with entry into force in 1993. Establishes the European 
Union and renames the EEC to the European Community 
(EC). Establishes increased intergovernmental cooperation 
and sets goals for all 12 member states: monetary union by 
1999, European citizenship, and common policies both 
internal and foreign. 
Treaty of Nice 
Signed in 2001, entry into force in 2003. Further extends 
qualified majority voting. Increases powers of the 
European Commission and its president. Provides greater 
voting weight to members in the European Council with 
larger populations. 
Treaty on the 
Functioning of the 
Union (TFEU) 
Renamed from the Treaty Establishing the European 




Under the Treaty of Nice, a qualified majority, and in turn 
a decision, is reached when member states representing 62 
percent of the entire EU population vote in favor of the 
decision. Later modified by the ToL to begin in 2014, 
wherein a decision will pass if 55 percent of member states 
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 In 2011, this represents 326M of the 502M total citizens in the EU. 
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COUNTRY GROUPINGS FOR ANALYSIS 
EU6 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
(1952) 
EU9 
Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), 
Portugal, Spain (1986), Austria, Finland, Sweden (1995) 
EU12 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia (2004), Cyprus, Malta (2004), Bulgaria, 
Romania (2007) 
North 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, United 
Kingdom (arbitrarily determined as countries with the majority of 






Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Spain (countries with the majority of their territory 







Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Slovakia (public social 
expenditures are less than 20 percent of GDP in 2005 and 2007) 
Medium Welfare 
State 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom (public social 




Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden 
(public social expenditures are greater than 25 percent of GDP in 
2005 and 2007) 
Micro State Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta (Population Size
4
 arbitrarily 
determines this grouping of states based on common divisions of 
states in EU literature
5
 as state with a population less than 1M 
citizens) 
Small State 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden 
(population between 1M and 30M) 
Medium State Poland, Spain (population between 30M and 50M) 
Large State France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom. (population greater 
than 50M) 
                                                 
2
 This specification is not used in the literature states are instead referred to as northern or southern without 
a systematic grouping method (OPTEM 2001). 
3
 Data on total social expenditures from OECD are not available for the following countries: Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Romania. 
4
 (Lanzieri 2008) 
5
 (Thorhallsson 2006) 
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Left 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Sweden (State classified based on an average expert 
score less than 5 using CHES 2006
6
 general political spectrum 
question where 0 is extreme left and 10 is extreme right) 
Right 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom (average expert score greater 
than 5 on CHES spectrum) 
Net Contributor 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (Evaluated 
as net contributors based on Commission budget calculations of 




                                                 
6
 Data for Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta are not available. 
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CHAPTER 1– INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigates the rising discontent among citizens in the European Union (EU). 
Further EU building is currently underway with enlargement to include a new member 
state by 2013 and a new treaty delegating national control over fiscal policy to the EU 
level. This project clarifies the preferences of citizens in the context of similar EU 
building changes and offers insight into what influences public opinion. In this chapter I 
briefly explore the meaning of regional integration and the process of EU building. I 
present this project‟s research design and define my dependent variable citizen 
discontent. The chapter concludes with an overview of my contribution to the literature, 
the timeline of this study, the datasets being used, and an overview of the chapters to 
follow. 
Regional integration consists of the signing of trade agreements between states. 
This process can take two forms. The first, geographical enlargement, also referred to as 
widening, consists of the growth of the Union‟s signatory states from the original six 
inner members to the current 27 countries. The second form, termed integration 
deepening, comprises the gradual shift of national decision-making on policy issues and 
control to the supranational EU level. Areas affected by this power shift range from 
management of the economy to national security and foreign affairs. 
Ratification is the process by which national governments adopt these treaties 
signed at the supranational level. In general they require majority votes in national 
parliaments although occasionally ratification will take the form of binding referenda in 
which citizens vote directly on the treaty in question. Overall support for EU building 
was generally high until failed referenda on institutional deepening treaties, beginning in 
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1992 with the Treaty of Maastricht, revealed growing dissatisfaction among EU citizens. 
Opposition during more recent treaty referenda on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe (TCE) and the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) combined with public polling data on 
the EU also signal that citizen discontent is increasing. Existing studies conclude that, 
when citizens voted against deepening treaties in these referenda, they did so based on 
negative orientations toward some other EU-related change such as the implementation 
of a common currency (the Euro) or integration widening to include new Eastern 
European members and Turkey. 
Prior research suggests that EU building in the past was led by political elites 
(leaders who sign the treaties and ratify them in national parliaments) that acted based on 
permissive consensus. This theory of representation suggests that elites vote on EU issues 
furthering integration, based on the assumption that citizens generally support the EU 
(that the EU is a good thing), while ignoring their preferences on individual policies 
(such as those contained in a treaty) or the inclusion of new member states. Further EU 
building is underway with a seventh enlargement to include membership of Croatia 
scheduled for 2013 and expected referenda on an EU-wide fiscal treaty (the European 
Stability Mechanism) with currently ongoing ratification in national parliaments. A 
determination of elite representation of citizen interests as well as the degree of citizen 
consensus on the EU therefore becomes necessary to predict the success of this future EU 
integration. 
In the next section I present an overview of the types of treaties signed in the EU 
which advanced both deepening and widening to date. This overview provides the 
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necessary historical context to then examine the degree of support for these treaties 
among elites and citizens. 
 
Integration Treaties 
Treaties for enlargement are called accession treaties and they are signed by all member 
states as well as the acceding candidate countries. A total of six such treaties have been 
signed to date, the first of which took place in 1973 when Denmark, Ireland, and the 
United Kingdom joined the original inner six members Belgium, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Italy, France, and Germany (West) in the European Economic Community 
(EEC) previously the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Greece acceded in 
1981 followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
comprised the fourth round of enlargements. The largest expansion, which also inspired 
the greatest amount of contention, happened in 2004 when ten new states joined the 
Union: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia (McCormick 2008). The final wave of geographical widening 
occurred in 2007 with the accession of the remaining two eastern European countries 
Romania and Bulgaria. 
Deepening treaties have gradually shifted the Union from a simple trade 
agreement to a supranational institution responsible for issues ranging from the 
elimination of trade, capital, and labor barriers between member states to the 
collaboration of members on foreign action policies. The Treaty of Rome, signed by 
ECSC members in 1957, built on the original trade agreement the Treaty of Paris.
7
 The 
                                                 
7
 The Treaty of Paris was originally signed by six states in 1951 that established the ECSC. 
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new treaty was formally named the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community (TEEC). It expanded the existing common market in coal and steel to include 
a wider range of goods and services, eliminated customs duties, and instituted common 
agricultural and trade policies among member states. The Single European Act (SEA), 
signed in 1986 by the then twelve members, amended the EEC‟s founding treaty. The 
SEA deepened the Community‟s powers within member states by creating a single 
market, expanding on the TEEC to ensure unrestricted movement of goods and services 
and the free movement of capital and labor across borders. 
In 1992, the same twelve members signed a new treaty in Maastricht changing the 
name of the common market from the EEC to simply the European Community. The 
treaty entered into force in 1993 and was named the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It 
established provisions for intergovernmental coordination between member states on 
common monetary policy, European citizenship, common foreign and security policies, 
and increased coordination in military, justice, and home affairs. Since Maastricht, the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), the Treaty of Nice (2003), and finally the Treaty of Lisbon 
(2009) have further deepened these powers by shifting policies
8
 that were formerly of 
national jurisdiction to the supranational level, including but not limited to enhanced 
cooperation on economic growth, employment, social welfare, security, and health. 
The most recent act of integration deepening is the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) which 
is a slightly reformed version of the failed Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
(TCE). Although some symbolic elements were removed, the substance of the ToL 
remains largely identical to the TCE and is therefore also referred to here as a 
                                                 
8
 For more details on policy areas and changes in voting powers see Finke (2010: 31-37) 
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constitutional treaty. The following provides an overview of the ToL while a more in 
depth description of the process of adoption is provided in Chapter 2 and details of the 
changes it enacted in Chapter 3. The changes are each linked to the questions in the 
datasets under investigation which allow me to evaluate citizen opposition. 
The ToL‟s articles reform the TEU and the TEEC and rename the latter to the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Treaty changes mainly affect 
the powers of the Union‟s institutions. These emerge through the abolishment of the 
treaty based pillar structure which divided each institution‟s powers according to policy 
area. The reform creates greater consistency in institutional powers across all old and new 
EU policy areas. The European Parliament (EP) composed of elected officials from each 
member state thus gains legislative power. The Council of the European Union, 
composed of Ministers from each member state, also acquires increased voting 
privileges. The European Commission, the executive institution of the EU, secures 
greater influence through the broader range of policies under EU jurisdiction as well as 
increased independence in the selection and appointment of commissioners responsible 
for their implementation. The European Court of Justice (ECJ), responsible for dispute 
settlement between members, expands judicial powers to include the areas of freedom 
(including free movement and asylum, commercial and civil rights), and security 
(including criminal matters and public safety). 
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Research Questions 
 
(RQ3) What is the nature of citizen discontent? 
Citizen Preferences on the EU in General Elite Preferences on Integration Treaties 
(RQ1) What is the degree of permissive consensus in the EU? 
Citizen Discontent (DV) 
(RQ2) Is discontent with the ToL a general phenomenon across all member states? 
Failed TCE and ToL Referenda 
Explanatory Factors (IVs) 
- Cognitive Mobilization 
- Political Values 
- Party Affiliation 
- Utilitarian Theory 
- Support for Government 
- Fear of Perceived EU Threat  
- European Identity 
- Individual Value Dimensions 
 
Models 
- Length of Membership 




- Welfare State Size 
- North-South  
- Population Size  
- Left-Right 







(RQ4) What explains citizen discontent? 
Figure 1.1 – The Research 
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In Figure 1.1, I outline the structure of this project including the research questions under 
investigation and the variables (factors) utilized to answer these questions. The project 
begins with a brief historical overview of the TCE and the subsequent Reform Treaty, the 
ToL. I explore the path to rejection of the TCE and the steps to ratification of the ToL. In 
this historical overview I identify the actors driving integration and the evidence of public 
opposition to it. While elites in the past have made decisions based on citizens‟ general 
support for the EU through permissive consensus, I expect based on anti-EU voting in 
referenda that general support is decreasing and that elites are failing to represent citizen 
preferences when ratifying these treaties. I investigate whether there is in fact a lack of 
representation of citizen interests during EU building and answer the first research 
question RQ1: What is the degree of permissive consensus in the EU? This first research 
question examines the state of permissive consensus through exploration of the degree of 
like-mindedness among elites on the recent TCE and ToL with a comparison to citizen 
opinion on the EU in general. 
Through a presentation of the similarities in substance and differences in adoption 
between the TCE and the ToL, it becomes evident that opposition explicitly expressed to 
one should remain ever present in the other. While referenda were only held in one 
country, to verify whether citizens were actually in favor of the ToL I investigate RQ2: Is 
discontent with the ToL a general phenomenon across all member states? I investigate 
whether the degree of citizen discontent, my dependent variable (DV), expressed through 
citizen opposition in referenda in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland is a general 
phenomenon across all 27 member states. 
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Although failed referenda demonstrate discontent in the EU, I expect that 
dissatisfaction expressed through direct voting on an EU treaty is not necessarily based 
on opposition directly to that treaty. According to existing studies, citizens likely voted 
against some other issue. These issues include general EU support, elements included 
within the treaty but not the whole document, widening (i.e. inclusion of additional 
members), the Euro, and the expansion of EU authority (Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca 
2008, Aarts and van der Kolk 2006, Milner 2006). In other words, according to these 
authors, discontent with the TCE varied in nature and this phenomenon should also be 
the case in the context of the ToL. I will therefore expand on this research by comparing 
citizen opposition on each of these forms of integration and answer the third research 
question RQ3: What is the nature of citizen discontent in the EU? This question is 
exploratory and based on the lack of consensus in the literature I do not set out with any 
expectations. 
Finally, there are several conclusions in the literature regarding which factors may 
be most important in driving citizen discontent. My work explores the multitude of 
possible integration support theories including: cognitive mobilization theory, political 
values theory, party affiliation, utilitarian theory, support for government, fear of threat to 
national culture, and the novel investigation of the role of individual values. These 
theories are used in my study to outline explanatory factors, also referred to here as 
independent variables (IVs). I briefly explain the effects of these factors below. Through 
multivariate analyses I create a hierarchy among the theories of support for integration 
and answer the final research question RQ4: What explains citizen discontent? 
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My investigation uses a widely cited model originally put forth by Gabel (1998) 
and reveals a hierarchy in these explanatory theories. I propose that popular assumptions 
such as the role of fear of other cultures, the level of financial and human capital driving 
utilitarian calculations, citizens‟ left-right political ideology, and the degree of support for 
national government may be less important than European identity and underlying 
individual values. 
 
Contribution to the Literature 
Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) suggest that elites went ahead with the European Monetary 
Union despite an awareness of citizen opposition to the Euro and concern over the effect 
it might have on social programs. European elites, with little recourse to public opinion or 
consideration of citizen opposition, make unanimous decisions on treaty signature and 
subsequent ratification. Stimson (1995) and Sanchez Martinez (1996) suggest that elites 
are able to make such decisions because general EU support is high enough that the 
public will not oppose decisions made on their behalf. Investigation of the representation 
of public opinion by elites is limited to the context of older treaties prior to the TCE. 
Through this analysis I will build on insights of previous research to determine the degree 
of consensus among elites and among citizens in the more recent contexts of the ToL. 
 With only few exceptions (Papier 2008), most recent studies of citizen 
preferences in the EU have been conducted solely in the context of the TCE and earlier 
deepening treaties. I look at these earlier treaties only to determine whether general 
support has changed over EU building history. I build on previous research, however, by 
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exploring citizen preferences during the most recent and successful round of integration: 
ToL ratification. 
In addition to the lack of recent studies of the elite-citizen gap in the context of 
the ToL, existing research of citizen opinion also focus mainly on the three countries 
where the TCE was rejected in referenda. My work will elaborate by establishing the 
generalizability of citizen discontent across all EU member states. Studies on the 
difference between questions of deepening versus widening are also scarce. Where 
studies compare these questions to each other, they are limited to simply support for a 
constitution versus support for enlargement in general (Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca 
2008). My research builds on this investigation by examining these same integration 
questions and further exploring opposition to individual treaty changes, attitudes toward 
the Euro, and support or accession of Turkey, Croatia, and Macedonia within 
enlargement. 
Previous research centers mainly on the role of financial and human capital as 
utilitarian factors driving integration preferences (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007, McLaren 
2002, Gabel 1998). Additionally, the level of analysis is usually either on state variations 
or individual differences. My thesis examines the various theories of support for 
integration and measures their influence at the individual level while also controlling for 
state-level differences identified by prior studies. I build on existing theories by 
incorporating an evaluation of the role of European identity and a novel investigation of 
the values that underlie identity and individual behavior. In combining an analysis of all 
these potentially significant factors, it is possible for me to establish a hierarchy of 
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Defining Discontent (DV) as Opposition to Integration in any of its Forms 
In this project I define citizen opposition as „discontent‟. Norris (2011: 37) emphasizes 
that it is important to separate attitudes from the behavior (actions) resulting from those 
attitudes, discontent in this sense is an attitude. The author explains that many scholars 
tend to combine the two concepts as equivalent measures. She claims, for example, that 
support for democracy is often defined as a “willingness to obey the law…to pay taxes… 
(or) to participate in civic affairs.” In other words, attitudes of support are usually 
measured through the evaluation of citizen actions. 
Weβels (2007) uses the term discontent to describe those individuals who respond 
negatively to EU integration. Discontent is measured based on low support for specific 
authorities (political parties and ministers in the European Parliament), general 
authorities (the institutions of the EU), and the regime at the highest level (membership in 
the Union). In his study, the author uses “discontent” interchangeably with the terms 
“negative orientation,” “critical,” and “euroscepticism.” On the general support for the 
EU question (whether EU membership “is a good thing”) the author concludes discontent 
to exist when individuals provide survey responses such as “membership in the EU is a 
bad thing for my country”. 
In this study, the behavior (actions) that I would expect to result from attitudes 
toward a particular integration change would only be measurable by examining direct 
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citizen votes on a treaty. However, voting on treaties only occurred in France, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg on the TCE and in Ireland on the ToL. Discontent is 
therefore only expressed as a behavior in the three countries where citizens had the 
opportunity to vote and voted NO. I cannot measure actions across member states 
therefore, I will instead define attitudes as discontent in the same manner as Weβels. 
While he measures support for authorities, I observe discontent with EU building through 
integration (namely through ToL deepening changes, and future enlargement) as well as 
for the EU in general and the Euro. Discontent is measured through negative survey 
responses to specific questions relating to EU changes. Responses are “against” or 
“disagree” with a certain change, or the EU is “a bad thing” and my country has “no 
benefit” from membership. Questions are outlined in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Explanatory Factors (IVs), Models, and Controls 
Individual-level socio-economic and socio-cultural variables that influence support for 
integration are explained by several theories as listed above and make up the independent 
variables of this study. Cognitive mobilization suggests that high political awareness 
increases EU support. Political values theory proposes that materialist values such as 
economic and security concerns will lead to reduced support of the EU. Party affiliation 
concerns the role of one‟s political ideology wherein more left-leaning individuals will 
also be less pro-EU. Utilitarian theory bases higher support on greater human and 
financial capital which allows citizens to more easily adapt to the competition in an open 
market created by the Union. Support for government theory purports that citizens who 
support national government are also in favor of the EU based on the high degree of pro-
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EU decision-making by national governments and trust that they are acting in citizens‟ 
best interest. European identity is claimed to increase support for the EU based on 
socialization of the Union into citizens‟ concept of self. Finally, the inclusion of values is 
exploratory and the analysis proceeds with little expectation on the direction of value 
effects on EU support. 
Building on the lack of individual-state level comparisons in the literature, my 
analysis sets out different models wherein I control for length of membership,
9
 while also 
including controls
10
 for the size of the state‟s welfare system, the state‟s North-South 
geographical location, population size, left-right political positioning, and budgetary 
contributions. Individual-level characteristics include control variables for age, gender, 
and employment modeled after Gabel (1998). 
 
Timeline 
There are two considerations when choosing the timeline for this study. The first regards 
the dates when the TCE was rejected and when ToL negotiations and ratification took 
place. I observe these dates because the TCE is the first instance in the EU where citizens 
have directly voted on a treaty and managed to reject it. Additionally, the ToL represents 
the most recent round of integration and is yet to be observed in much detail by the 
literature. The dates under investigation are as follows: I briefly present general EU 
opinion data dating back to the first enlargement in 1973 through to most recently 
available survey data from 2011. This time series provides an overview of the shift in 
general support since the beginning of EU building in response to RQ1. I examine data in 
                                                 
9
 Length of membership is based on enlargement groups outlined in Chapter 3 and in the Glossary.  
10
 Controls are explained in Chapter 4. 
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more detail from 2006 after the TCE was abandoned until 2009 when the ToL entered 
into force. 
The second consideration concerns the availability of public opinion data through 
the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys. EB datasets that pose the relevant questions for RQ2-
RQ4 exist only between September-October 2006 and June-July 2009. The main timeline 
for this study will thus be limited to these EB dates. 
 
Datasets 
To determine ratification votes at the national parliamentary level on RQ1, I use data 
from the Robert Schuman Foundation (2009) and the Council of the European Union 
(Consilium 2011). 
 I draw data for the state-level controls and the different model specifications in 
this research from two sources. Population size, length of membership, and budgetary 
contributions are retrieved from the official European Union data published by the 
European Commission through ec.europa.eu. Data for states‟ left-right political 
positioning are retrieved from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES).
11
 
 Individual-level independent variables and individual-level control variables are 
drawn from the Eurobarometer and the European Values Study which are both available 
from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and the 
GESIS data archives. There are several types of Eurobarometers, for the purpose of this 
                                                 
11
 The CHES consists of a compilation of survey responses from multiple academics, experts on European 
political parties across four different years. I draw here on 2006 data only. This study surveyed a total of 
528 academics in 2007, asking them about party positions in 2006. The survey had a response rate of 45 
percent, representing 235 completed questionnaires. Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta are excluded from all 
CHES survey waves (Hooghe et al. 2010). 
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study I will focus on the standard EBs
12
 with some reference to Flash Eurobarometer 
reports. Flash EBs are conducted by EOS-Gallup Europe on behalf of the European 
Commission. They are usually administered in just one member state and are designed to 
observe very specific topics. For example, there were Flash EBs carried out in each of the 
five countries who held referenda on the TCE and ToL and questions related directly to 
these referenda. Standard EBs are conducted twice a year also by EOS-Gallup Europe. 
The questionnaires monitor the social and political attitudes of citizens from 31 countries 
including EU member countries, candidate countries, and Turkey. Although each EB 
explores a varying range of topics, each one also includes a list of standard questions 
posed in every survey wave. I will use the following EBs: 
– 66.1 European Values and Societal Issues, Mobile Phone Use, and Farm Animal 
Welfare, September-October 2006 
– 67.2 European Union Enlargement, Personal Data Privacy, the National Economy, 
and Scientific Research, April-May 2007 
– 68.2 European Union Policy and Decision Making, Corruption, Civil Justice, E-
Communications, Agriculture, and Environmental Protection, November 2007-
January 2008  
– 69.2 National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and 
Climate Change, March-May 2008 
– 71.1 European Parliament and Elections, Economic Crisis, Climate Change, and 
Chemical Products, January-February 2009 
                                                 
12
 On Flash Eurobarometers, the questions help to understand the “no” votes in France, the Netherlands, 
and Ireland, however, for treaty questions, they are limited to these three countries. Hence, a comparison 
with other EU members on questions of EU deepening is not possible with Flash EBs. 
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– 71.3 Globalization, Personal Values and Priorities, European Identity, Future of the 
European Union, Social Problems and Welfare, and European Elections, June-July, 
2009 
In order to investigate individual level variables that reflect the role of socio-cultural 
factors such as values and identity, I use the 2008 European Values Study. This survey 
monitors social and political attitudes of citizens and includes questions relating to 
beliefs, ideas and preferences as well. The survey was administered in 47 European 
countries and regions (only 27 of which are relevant here) to a total of 70,000 
respondents (40,465 from EU member countries). Each survey evaluated in this project 
contains responses from on average over 30,000 respondents. 
 
Chapters 
The current chapter has provided an introduction to the research questions under 
investigation in this project, a breakdown of EU building under investigation, and a 
roadmap of the data and explanatory factors being observed. The ensuing chapters follow 
the same sequence as my research questions. In Chapter 2 I present a historical overview 
of the TCE and the ToL with an explanation of the paths to rejection and adoption. I then 
provide a brief overview of the debate over the legitimacy of the EU and whether citizen 
preferences are reflected by elites. I detail the theory of permissive consensus and provide 
evidence of the declining general support for the EU since Maastricht in 1992 for a 
response to RQ1. Based on this decreasing support and discontent evidenced by failed 
referenda on the TCE treaties, I expect that had citizens been given the chance to vote on 
the ToL, there would have been a greater number of failed referenda. I thus set out to 
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answer RQ2 by creating a multidimensional measure of citizen responses to changes 
implemented by the ToL and evaluate public opinion on this treaty. 
As much of the literature suggests that citizens were opposed to something other 
than the treaty when voting against it, my analysis turns next to a qualification of citizen 
discontent. In Chapter 3, I begin with a description of the elements included in the ToL, a 
document substantively identical to the originally rejected TCE. I thus address RQ3 by 
comparing these treaty changes rejected in a few countries, to other forms of integration. 
Through an overview of many of the popular conclusions made by EU scholars on 
general citizen opinion I present the variety of possible aspects of EU building to which 
citizens may be opposed, including the EU in general, the ToL in general, the Euro, or 
enlargement. 
 In Chapter 4, I provide a variety of theories used to explain citizen opinion and 
address RQ4. My analysis also includes an evaluation of values which are generally 
ignored by the literature. I use a method modeled after Gabel (1998) and, using his 
theories of public opinion complemented by additional factors also drawn from other 
sources, I create a hierarchy of explanatory theories. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the 
findings of my research. I address the theoretical and practical implications of my 
research, outline caveats and propose further research.
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CHAPTER 2 – CITIZEN DISCONTENT AND THE END OF PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the first two research questions of this project by examining the 
degree to which citizen EU preferences are represented by elites in national parliaments 
as well as the variation in citizen preferences across member states. In order to properly 
understand this dynamic, I first explore the process of adoption of the TCE versus the 
ToL. Through this overview I detail the actors involved in the process and briefly explain 
permissive consensus as a theory of representation in the EU. In response to RQ1, I 
analyze general citizen support for the EU compared to elite support for the ToL. I 
purport that if general support is high, elites can continue to rely on permissive consensus 
to push integration forward. However, if anti-EU sentiment is increasing future EU 
building may be threatened. Finally, based on anti-treaty voting in referenda on both 
integration deepening treaties in select countries, I set out to answer RQ2 through 
empirical investigation of the degree of discontent with the ToL across all member states. 
 
The Treaty Process  
The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) 
One of the most significant attempts at institutional deepening in the EU came about in 
the form of the TCE later replicated in the ToL. This document was designed to replace 
the treaties that came before it, to simplify the legislative language of the Union, and to 
make an ever growing Union more transparent and democratic, while strengthening the 
EU‟s institutional powers and extending its policy scope. 
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Negotiations of the TCE began with the European Council (EC) meeting in 
Laeken, Belgium on December 14-15, 2001 attended by heads of state and government 
from each member country. EC members of the then 15 member states decided to 
“increase the momentum of (the EU‟s) integration” (European Council 2001: 1). The 
declaration called for a Convention on the Future of Europe which would set out to 
review the issues faced by the EU, including the “division and definition of competence,” 
the “simplification of the Union‟s instruments,” the increase of “democracy, transparency 
and efficiency,” and the shift toward simplification of existing treaties in the form of a 
“Constitution for European citizens” (European Council 2001: 21-23). The Convention 
was presided over by the former French president Valéry Giscard d‟Estaing and attended 
by the Heads of State or Government of each of the member states as well as 
representatives from each member state and candidate country‟s national parliaments, the 
European Parliament, and the European Commission. 
The first meeting was held on February 28, 2002 and in 26 plenary sessions 
totaling 52 days of gatherings, the participants of the Convention deliberated over the 
future of the European Union and the issues brought forth by the Laeken Declaration. 
During this time, the representatives of each member state and accession state also 
received input from the public through committees, conferences, working groups, and 
online discussions (The European Convention 2003). 
 On July 18, 2003 the Convention submitted its draft of the TCE to the President 
of the European Council. The draft was then debated at the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) beginning October 4, 2003 by the Heads of State or Government and 
their Foreign Ministers, European Commission representatives, and Ministers of the 
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European Parliament. Negotiations were drawn out due to certain contentious issues such 
as the definition of qualified majority voting and the composition of the Commission 
(Europa.eu 2008) until finally, on June 18, 2004, European Council members agreed on 
the final text of the TCE. Each of the 25 member states at the time signed the TCE in 
Rome on October 29, 2004. 
The treaty then underwent an unsuccessful ratification process. Generally, 
ratification was completed in national parliaments. However, due to the constitutional 
language of the TCE, a few individual state legislatures required that they take the treaty 
to referenda. Spain and Luxembourg each held referenda on May 29 and July 10, 2005 
respectively, where citizens voted in favor. On April 1, the Netherlands also held a 
referendum and 61 percent of the voters said “no” to the Treaty. On May 29, French 
voters also rejected the Treaty with 55 percent against. Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and 
Portugal subsequently cancelled their referenda and the TCE was abandoned. Therefore, 
despite the involvement of citizens and their representatives in the drafting process, when 
given the opportunity Europeans ultimately rejected the TCE. At the European Council 
meeting held June 16 and 17, 2005, leaders of the member states declared the beginning 
of a “period of reflection” temporarily stalling integration. 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) 
Integration was not delayed for long despite public rejection and on June 23, 2007 the 
“period of reflection” came to an end with the announcement by the European Council of 
an IGC for the adoption of a new treaty. The treaty, initially entitled the “Reform Treaty,” 
unlike the TCE would not replace previous treaties but instead amend existing ones. The 
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reforms originally agreed upon during the previous IGC which concluded with the TCE 
were incorporated into the new Reform Treaty. 
Amendments affected both the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (also called the 
Maastricht Treaty) and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEEC) (also 
known as the Rome Treaty) renaming it the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). All constitutional terminology including terms such as “„law‟ and 
„framework law‟ (were) abandoned, the existing denominations „regulations‟, „directives‟ 
and „decisions‟ being retained”(European Council 2007). Finally, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was retained but not as part of the treaty itself, instead a clause was 
inserted in the Reform Treaty referring to the Charter. 
The IGC began its work on July 23, 2007 in Lisbon. This conference proceeded in 
a similar manner to that of 2003-2004 with meetings of Heads of State or Government, 
the General Affairs and External Relations Council, a representative of the Commission 
and three representatives from the European Parliament of each of the now 27 member 
states. A few issues arose along the path to signature and ratification of the Reform 
Treaty. On October 5, 2007 the first draft of the Reform Treaty protocols were submitted 
to the IGC, these protocols included a “derogatory measure” for the United Kingdom and 
Poland which states that laws outlined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
shall not supersede national laws in those countries (Fondation Robert Schuman 2009). A 
further measure was included in these 2007 protocols allowing for the United Kingdom 
and Ireland to opt-out of decisions made by qualified majority voting in the area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, while other member states are automatically bound by 
these decisions (Brunsden 2007, Kurpas 2007). 
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On December 13, 2007 at the European Council meeting, leaders of each of the 
member states signed the treaty in Lisbon, Portugal giving the Reform Treaty the name 
„Treaty of Lisbon‟ (ToL). The ToL, due to the removal of the constitutional language 
previously found in the TCE and the change in status to an „amending treaty‟, was 
ratified in the most part through parliamentary votes. According to national laws in those 
countries which held referenda on the TCE, this process is required in order to ratify a 
new EU treaty. However, because the ToL does not replace existing treaties but instead 
amends them, a referendum was no longer legally required for ratification. In Ireland, a 
1987 ruling from the Supreme Court guarantees that any major change to an existing EU 
treaty will in turn modify the Irish constitution and therefore requires a referendum. Two 
referenda were required before the document went through. Voters first rejected the ToL 
on June 12, 2008. Following a set of “guarantees” promised to the Irish government in 
June 2009 (Peers 2009), a second referendum was held on October 2, 2009. This time, 
Irish voters opted for ratification of the treaty. 
The Czech Republic held out until November 2009 pending signature of the ToL 
by the Czech President. The President demanded that the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
not supersede Czech national law. In order to avoid another treaty failure, in October 
2009 the Czech Republic was granted the same measures as were agreed upon for the UK 
and Poland with reference to the application of the Charter, wherein EU law cannot 
supersede national jurisdiction (Fondation Robert Schuman 2009). Despite a rocky road 
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Comparing Preferences – Are Citizens Represented in the EU? 
Although there were other actors involved in the process during the IGC and drafting 
stages of the TCE and the ToL, the ultimate decision on each of these treaties remained in 
the hands of member state leaders and parliaments who signed and ratified them. This 
was facilitated in the past by the broad general support for the EU among citizens. In this 
section I detail the theory of permissive consensus as a possible explanation for the form 
of representation in the EU. This theory was largely relied upon to explain the elite-
driven decision-making throughout the history of EU-building. In response to RQ1, I 
evaluate whether elites continue to rely on permissive consensus to further integration. 
The state of permissive consensus is first evaluated through a figure that maps general 
support for the EU among citizens since the adoption of the 1
st
 enlargement treaty in 
1973. The analysis then turns to the comparison of elite consensus on the ToL versus 
general EU support among citizens.  
 
Measuring Elite Legitimacy through Representation 
In both ratification contexts, the TCE and the ToL, despite unanimous signature by all EC 
members, the process differed drastically in the two cases. In the context of the TCE, 
citizens expressed an opposition to the document through referenda and ultimately voted 
it down. While on the ToL, opinions of citizens previously expressed in TCE referenda 
were avoided by slight changes in the document‟s wording, ensuring ratification at the 
national parliamentary level in all countries (except in Ireland) and nearly avoiding 
referenda altogether. During parliamentary votes, the majority of all national parliaments 
composed of member state governments and opposition parties approved the treaty. Such 
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actions inspire questions as to the representativeness of elite decision-making at the level 
of treaty ratification, especially where citizens in countries like the Netherlands and 
France outright rejected a treaty that was subsequently adopted with an approval rating in 
parliament of over 75 percent. 
 The mandate given to the IGC in 2007 by heads of state and government ensured 
that the Union, taking on more of the national state‟s powers, would do so in a way that 
was representative of public interests (Official Journal of the European Union 2007: 3). 
Title II of the ToL, the Provisions on Democratic Principles states in Article 10 that “the 
functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.” 
 Representation in the EU has been heavily debated by scholars since Maastricht 
(Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007). The main reason for this emergence in literature was 
the increase in institutionalization and the concern over a transfer of power from the 
member states to the supranational level and the resulting loss of representation of citizen 
interests by elected officials. As a result of the Single European Act debates abound over 
what democracy should look like in the EU. The adoption of many of the functions of the 
member states by these supranational institutions has led to criticisms of the Union and 
the lack of adequate measures to reflect public interest. Those who argue that the EU 
should function similarly to a nation state contend that the EU is undemocratic and assess 
the quality of democracy based on the representation of preferences communicated 
through direct participation in the form of voting (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007: 2). 
They claim therefore that democracy is deficient in the EU context due to the inexistence 
of such mechanisms. 
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Considering the EU itself proposes to “enhance democratic legitimacy” it is 
necessary to establish a working definition of the term. Rehfeld (2005) broadly defines 
that a system may be democratic as long as government law-making is met with public 
approval. He states: “a legitimate government is one that has and maintains its people‟s 
approval” (15). This definition ignores the institutional mechanisms such as elections and 
deliberation commonly associated with democracies. This can be applied to the 
government as a whole or to a specific law passed by government and can be measured 
by calculating the degree to which political leaders enact citizen preferences. Without the 
mechanisms that enable citizens to vote directly on decisions like the ToL, except 
occasional referenda, political decision-makers are required to rely on other sources to 
collect information on citizen preferences. Permissive consensus explains how elites have 
gone about making such decisions in the EU. 
 
The Role of Permissive Consensus 
Authors have argued that the process of integration in the EU has been mostly pushed 
forward by political elites (Best et al. 2012, Haller 2008). First termed by Key (1961), 
“permissive consensus” is the concept that elites can drive decision-making thanks to a 
lack of public interest on a particular policy issue and where, as long as citizens‟ general 
EU mood is positive, elites will interpret this as permission for greater integration. 
Although this was largely the case for most of the first three decades of the EU‟s 
existence, anti-EU sentiment among citizens began to move to the forefront of European 
Union academic research after Maastricht and permissive consensus became increasingly 
questioned (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007, Gabel 1998, Sanchez Martinez 1996, Stimson 
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et al. 1995). Figure 2.1 illustrates the shift in general support among citizens since the 1
st
 
enlargement of 1973. Where general support is high, permissive consensus argues that 
elites could make decisions on behalf of citizens largely uncriticized.
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EU Building (by Year) 
Citizen Support for the EU in General 
1973-2011 
Source: European Commission (Eurobarometer) 
"Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership in the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing?" 
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In Figure 2.1 I demonstrate that on the general EU support question: “Generally 
speaking, do you think that (your country‟s) membership in the European Community 
(Common Market) is a good thing?” that support has declined substantially since 1993.13 
The graph illustrates a spike in pro-EU sentiment immediately prior to Maastricht 
followed by a steady decrease across all member states of the EU of nearly 25 percentage 
points. This indicates that permissive consensus may still have been in effect when elites 
ratified Maastricht. Between 2006 and 2009, however, when negotiations and 
ratifications were underway for the ToL as well as the final Eastern enlargement, general 
support declined by nearly 10 percent. This finding suggests that discontent with the EU 
in general is rising considerably and that elites are no longer acting in a manner that is 
representative of citizen overall support for the EU. 
This phenomenon is confirmed by the increasing number of failed referenda since 
1992 as well: one on the Treaty of Maastricht, one on the Treaty of Nice, two on the 
TCE, and one in Ireland. While Figure 2.1 provides evidence that general support is 
declining, proper evaluation of the representativeness of elites requires observation of the 
degree of elite support for further integration. Figure 2.2 illustrates the degree of like-
mindedness among elites on the ToL. I rely on ratification votes in national parliaments 
for levels of political party support. The level of elite consensus is compared to citizens‟ 
pro-EU sentiment as measured in Figure 2.1 across all member states. This evaluation 
serves to further verify whether elites are acting on permissive consent from citizens.
                                                 
13
 The date for the Treaty of Maastricht listed here is the date wherein the treaty entered into force. 
29 
Chapter 2     
 












-1% 6% 10% 12% 12% 13% 16% 20% 20% 22% 22% 22% 26% 26% 30% 31% 32% 32% 33% 34% 35% 36% 46% 48% 53% 57% 58%
National Political Parties Source: Consilium 2011  
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National Political Parties (NPP) on the ToL 
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In Figure 2.2 data are organized according to the size of the gap between elites and 
citizens from small to large. I observe that while elites are 85 percent in favor of the ToL 
across all EU member states, citizen support for the EU in general
14
 is only 57.6 percent. 
In all cases elite support is higher than citizens, except in the Netherlands where citizens 
are more pro-EU in general (by 1 percent) than elites are pro-ToL. The Figure suggests 
that, while permissive consensus requires general public support for further integration, 
citizens in Cyprus, the United Kingdom (UK), the Czech Republic, Sweden, Finland, 
Austria, Hungary, and Latvia are less than 50 percent pro-EU or less. The gap between 
the two groups reaches up to 58 percent. Had elites relied on this information to make 
EU-building decisions according to permissive consensus,, it is unlikely that the ToL 
would been ratified in parliament. 
 The figure shows that citizens were generally discontent with the EU while elites 
were generally in favor of ToL ratification regardless of this opposition. However, 
citizens were unable to express this opposition as they had in the TCE due to the lack of 
referenda held in each country. My next question thus investigates how much citizen 
support there was for the ToL specifically. I answer RQ2 and speculate if the ToL had 
been taken to a vote, whether it would have been accepted by citizens. 
 
The Degree of Discontent with the ToL 
Eurobarometer public opinion data immediately prior to the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon demonstrate that only 36 percent of all Europeans polled felt that things were 
                                                 
14
 Based on the question in the Eurobarometer 67.2 European Union Enlargement, Personal Data Privacy, 
the National Economy, and Scientific Research, April-May 2007: “Generally speaking, do you think that 
(OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is a good thing/bad thing?” 
31 
Chapter 2     
going in the right direction in the European Union at that time indicating that the 
decisions being made by those in power were counter to the preferences of the electorate. 
Furthermore, when asked if they felt that EU membership was good or bad, only 53 
percent responded that it was a good thing.
15
 These data, as well as the failed TCE 
referenda, suggest that support among citizens for the EU‟s treaties was not as unanimous 
as it was among political elites. 
 Figure 2.3 provides the degree of pro-ToL consensus among citizens across 
member states. In the standard EB surveys there are no questions that, on their own, can 
adequately portray citizens‟ views regarding the ToL. Consequently, the 
multidimensional measure combines questions that capture responses to important 
individual changes made by the treaty into a single variable for ToL preferences. These 
changes are the same as those made by the TCE. I determine the degree of citizen 
discontent with the ToL using responses to this constructed multidimensional measure
16
 
across all member states. This measure provides an indication of what citizen support for 
the treaty would be assuming they were aware of the treaty‟s content. Chapter 3 further 
examines these changes and investigates the relationship between opinion on a treaty as a 
„constitution‟ and attitudes toward the changes contained within it.
                                                 
15
 Based on the question in the Eurobarometer 71.3: Globalization, Personal Values and Priorities, 
European Identity, Future of the European Union, Social Problems and Welfare, and European Elections 
conducted from June-July, 2009: “At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in 
the right direction or in the wrong direction, in the European Union?” and “Generally speaking, do you 
think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is a good thing/bad thing?” 
16
 No EB contains questions that would adequately measure citizens‟ views on all ToL changes. Views are 
measurable through the responses to other key changes including increased involvement of the EU in 
foreign and security policy, defense, and the creation of the position of High Representative (called the 
Foreign Minister in the TCE). 
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65% 65% 66% 66% 67% 
71% 71% 73% 73% 73% 74% 
74% 75% 76% 
77% 78% 79% 
Citizens Source: Eurobarometer 67.2 Apr.-May 2007 
Citizen Preferences for the ToL 
Variation Across all Member States 
Average Support for ToL among all Citizens: 64.5% 
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Citizen opinion on this measure remains rather high and in general over 50 percent in 
favor. Nonetheless, in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the UK, support ranges from 32 to 
48 percent. Such low levels of support would have plausibly translated into failed 
referenda had the opportunity been provided. On the other hand, in countries where 
referenda were held on the TCE, approval of the ToL treaty changes is higher (55 percent 
in the Netherlands, and 65 percent in France). Even in Ireland, where citizens actually 
voted against the ToL in the first referendum, approval of its changes is at the rate of 66 
percent.  
On average, citizens‟ overall support is 64.5 percent. This is almost 10 percent 
above the average support for the EU in general. These findings suggest that, despite 
citizen discontent with the ToL in four countries and very low general support in eight 
countries, elites nonetheless drove the last integration treaty through with very little 
consideration of public opposition. Furthermore, the lower degree of support for the EU 
in general than for treaty changes, combined with support rates for the treaty that are 
inconsistent with referenda results, indicate that citizens who are discontent may be 
opposed to something other than the TCE or the ToL. 
 
Conclusion 
A substantial body of European Union literature to date has explored the preferences of 
political elites and citizens separately. Only a small number of them have actually 
addressed the existence of a disconnection between the two groups, Hug and König 
(2002) are among these few. The authors draw on the Amsterdam Treaty talks to 
demonstrate that political elites, in this case Intergovernmental Conference attendees, 
 34 
Chapter 2     
were aware of a disconnection with citizens and negotiated the document in such a way 
that would ensure ratification by avoiding opposition by domestic actors. Political elites 
responsible for the issues included in the draft Amsterdam Treaty removed elements from 
the final document that they deemed might be contentious for citizens. 
By modifying the title of the TCE into the “Reform Treaty” while keeping most 
substantive elements intact, political elites guaranteed that the ToL would not require 
referenda for ratification in most member states. It may be possible to assume, therefore, 
that member state leaders purposefully drew up and signed the Treaty of Lisbon in such a 
way that would avoid opposition. These suspicions are further corroborated in a 
statement by the former French President, Valéry Giscard d‟Estaing who presided over 
the first European Convention for the draft TCE: “Above all, (the Treaty of Lisbon) is to 
avoid having referendum thanks to the fact that the articles are spread out and 
constitutional vocabulary has been removed” (Spongenberg, 2007). In this chapter, I 
presented findings that showed that political elites who signed the ToL did so despite a 
lack of support by citizens from all EU member states on both ToL changes and 
especially on the EU in general. 
National parliaments ratified the ToL in such a way that citizens were excluded 
from the process, short of the referenda in Ireland. Based on the results of support for the 
treaty by political elites compared to citizens, I find that elites acted in a way which was 
largely inconsistent with citizens‟ interests. This chapter provided clarification of the first 
RQ by illustrating not only that elites are highly like-minded in their decision to ratify the 
ToL, but also they do so without a reliance on general permissiveness of citizens. 
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Without more detailed information
17
 on how parties make their decisions it is not 
possible to further investigate why elites make such decisions and why opposition parties 
fail to monopolize on the discontent. However, I can conclude that elites no longer act 
through permissive consensus and as they continue to make decisions that are not 
reflective of public opinion, the general discontent in the EU continues to rise. 
Discontent in the EU in general is in fact higher than discontent on the ToL 
measure. My response to RQ2 is thus, discontent with the ToL is not a general 
phenomenon across member states. Anti-treaty sentiment may be high in some states but 
it remains low enough to speculate that had the ToL gone to referenda it may have 
succeeded in those countries that originally rejected the TCE. On the other hand, low 
general support and a failed referendum in a first round in Ireland, combined with a 
history of failed referenda on other treaties confirms that citizens are discontent. With 
further EU building currently underway it is unclear whether public opinion will continue 
to decline as it remains uncertain what the public are discontent with, the next chapter 
investigates this question. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 A few studies investigate elite decision-making and a couple have accessible datasets. These include the 
Domestic Structures and European Integration, Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES), and reports from the 
Assemblée Nationale (AN). These studies, however, do not examine the preferences of elites who voted on 
the ToL directly nor do they ask questions about the ToL specifically. Each of the analyses relies either 
solely on the opinions of experts (DOSEI and CHES) or testimonials of representatives from only a handful 
of member states (AN). Expert and government representative opinions may be useful as a proxy for actual 
political party and government support for the EU in general however, they are limited in scope and any 
conclusions can only be drawn with caution. 
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CHAPTER 3 – THE NATURE OF DISCONTENT ACROSS MEMBER STATES 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore the RQ3. This question arises from the phenomenon of failed 
referenda in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland on the two similar treaties as well as 
evidence on the declining general EU support as explained in Chapter 2. While the 
previous section compared elite voting on the ToL with citizen opinion on the EU in 
general and on the constructed ToL measure, this next analysis will build on the citizen 
dimension by exploring whether it is plausible that this opposition observed in referenda 
on the TCE and on the ToL was actually opposition to some other element of EU 
building. I begin with an overview of public opinion literature that investigates discontent 
in the EU. In this overview I identity what many authors have observed as the object of 
citizen opposition. Furthermore, I draw out the forms of integration that I will investigate 
in my analysis including support for the EU in general, the Euro, enlargement, the treaty 
as a whole (through the measure including the most important treaty changes), and 
individual treaty changes. 
Prior to conducting the empirical analysis of citizen preferences I first provide 
details of the changes brought about by the ToL and the similarities it bears to the TCE. 
The illustration of the similarities further highlights the status of the ToL as no less than a 
constitution under another name. The likeness of the two treaties suggests that, had 
negative referenda on the TCE been based on opposition to the treaty itself, the ToL 
would surely have also been rejected had citizens been given a chance to vote on it. As I 
explore each change I provide the relevant survey questions from the Eurobarometers 
used in this project to test citizen support. I review the most significant of these changes 
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and explain my construction of the measure used to determine support for the ToL. I 
correlate the constructed measure with a support for the „constitution‟ question to 
determine whether opposition expressed in referenda can be assumed to be influenced by 
knowledge of the content of the treaty. I then proceed with a comparison of countries that 
rejected the treaties and examine their attitudes toward the various forms of integration. I 
proceed then with the same comparison across all member states of the EU and conclude 
with an analysis of the trade-off between forms of integration to determine when citizens 
oppose a constitution, whether they are also opposed to some other EU building change. 
 
Discontent with What? Understanding the Integration Question 
The disconnection between political elites and citizens on integration is clear based on 
the findings from Chapter 2 and referenda reveal that citizens are increasingly likely to 
oppose elite decision-making when given the chance. The question remains, however, 
“what are citizens opposed to?” Existing literature (European Commission 2008, Aarts 
and van der Kolk 2006, Milner 2006) that investigates this opposition in one or more of 
the three countries where the public voted, confirm that discontent among citizens exists. 
A large amount of variation in European citizen responses to EB surveys on the 
EU in general and their tendency to oppose treaties in referenda can be attributed to their 
understanding of EU integration. Additionally, many of the disagreements that arise in 
the literature are based on the conclusions drawn as a result of what form of integration is 
being analyzed. Questions analyzed in the literature are usually geographical widening, 
institutional deepening, or support for the EU very generally. 
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On general EU support, using the Eurobarometer questions “is membership a 
good/bad thing” and “has your country benefitted from EU membership,” McLaren 
(2002) and Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) suggest that there are significant variations 
across member states. Other authors contend rather that issues related to EU deepening, 
such as views on the Euro and the European Monetary Union (EMU) are most 
contentious among citizens (Aarts and van der Kolk 2006). 
OPTEM (2001) is a report created for the European Commission to raise 
awareness among policy makers and elites regarding the need to educate citizens on EU 
issues. The report combined findings that resulted from 86 group discussions with a total 
of 694 participants aged 25-60 from 24 EU members and candidate countries. The 
findings of this report indicate that variation in preferences exists across member states 
depending on whether the discussion focused on enlargement, on the general image of the 
EU, or on EU institutions. 
Hurrelman (2007: 358) suggests that “it is increasingly doubtful whether it is 
possible at all to get a single constitutional document ratified in all 27 Member States, 
given that the expectations placed in an EU Constitution differ widely in the Union‟s 
population.” This statement is grounded in the findings by other authors that citizens 
voted against the constitutional treaty for a variety of different reasons but also grounded 
in diverse interpretations of what the treaty actually stood for and the changes it proposed 
to make. 
Aarts and van der Kolk (2006) conclude that the Dutch voted not against the 
constitution but against enlargement in general and also against the Euro. In France, there 
are varying opinions as to why the referendum on the TCE resulted in a NO majority. 
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According to Milner (2006), initially French voters were swayed by the utility of the 
constitution and were generally in favor. During the campaign, however, when the 
question “what kind of society do we want?” was introduced to the debate by anti-EU 
advocates, the direction of voters‟ preferences changed and shifted the majority to a NO 
on the constitution. According to Milner, the NO vote was based on a “YES to union but 
NO to the constitution” as well as fear of expansion to include Turkey. He concludes, 
therefore, that the French voted against deepening through the TCE and against 
enlargement but not against the EU in general. 
According to Flash Eurobarometer data from 2005, 75 percent of French believed 
the constitution to be indispensable “this proposal is supported by 90 percent of YES 
voters, but also by 66 percent of NO voters (European Commission 2009b: 22). In other 
words, although the French voted against the TCE, the majority of those who voted were 
not against the constitution itself. These data are entirely contradictory to Milner‟s 
findings which suggest support for the union but not the constitution. Therefore, if 
opposition was not to the constitution and Milner claims citizens are supportive of the 
Union, then discontent which drove a NO at the French referendum should have been 
based on disagreement with something else entirely. Those that voted NO did so in large 
majority (76 percent) based on economic perceptions of the constitution, that it would 
have negative effects on the French economy or on employment. 
 In the Dutch case, the NO vote is claimed (Aarts and van der Kolk 2006) to be 
based on an opposition to enlargement and to the Euro. The post-referendum Flash 
Eurobarometer suggests on the other hand, that only 6 percent of those polled who voted 
NO did so based on opposition to future enlargement. A much larger percentage voted 
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against the treaty because of a lack of information (32 percent) and through a fear of loss 
of national sovereignty (19 percent). On whether the treaty was indispensable, where 75 
percent of both YES and NO voters in France said the constitution was essential to 
European construction, only 41 percent of all Dutch voters agreed. Among those who 
voted in favor of the treaty, only 66 percent claimed it to be essential, while 25 percent of 
those who voted against the treaty also consider it indispensable despite their voting it 
down (European Commission 2005: 21). 
 According to the Irish post-referendum survey, YES votes were based on the 
benefits the EU provides to Ireland grounding decisions in whether the Union in general 
is good for Ireland and that the ToL specifically is “in Ireland‟s best interest (32 percent 
of the reasons mentioned).” To a lesser extent, the Irish were pro-treaty based on the idea 
that the ToL would be economically beneficial for the country (European Commission 
2009b: 18-19). The NO vote on the other hand was motivated by citizens‟ feelings that 
they were not well enough informed on the changes made by the ToL (22 percent), a 
concern for the defense of Irish identity (12 percent), and objection to national political 
parties and government (six percent). These results seem to suggest that the Irish voted 
not on the Constitution necessarily. Opposition, however, is based on national discontent 
and would therefore not be reflected if looking specifically at Irish attitudes toward the 
EU. Support in Ireland appears to be based on a general support for the EU and its 
policies, regardless of the treaty in question. This finding is supported by Millward 
Brown IMS as reported by Quinlan wherein even citizens who voted against the treaty 
remain pro-EU in general (2009: 117). 
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 As observed through evaluation of the literature on opposition to the newest 
integration initiatives and Flash Eurobarometers conducted in those countries that 
actually held referenda, opposition to the treaties themselves is not necessarily what 
citizens are expressing when voting NO to further integration. Therefore, to properly 
evaluate preferences in the EU it is necessary to analyze these inclinations toward 
specific questions, not only in the sense of general support for the European Union or 
solely for one or the other of either enlargement or depending, but a comparison of each 
of these integration questions.  
Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca (2008) look at support for a constitution and 
support for enlargement and determine that there is little trade off in support for the two 
forms of integration. In other words: percentages of support for one are similar to 
percentages of support for the other. Their analysis reveals “in contrast to the past, when 
Germany always defended the compatibility of deepening and widening, it is now 
common to see leaders such as Angela Merkel making a negative linkage between 
deepening and widening, attributing the negative votes in France and the Netherlands to 
enlargement, calling for the EU to define its „final borders‟ and making the case for a 
„No‟ to Turkey‟s accession” (9). The authors focus explicitly on the main dichotomy in 
integration, the preferences on widening versus those on deepening. They claim that 
much of the literature to date that explores the TCE vote, assigns blame for the failure of 
the Dutch and French referenda to the most recent enlargement of the EU.  
The authors ask the question then whether there is a trade-off between 
enlargement and deepening. The findings of their study indicate that there are no 
variations in citizen opinion on deepening versus enlargement. I reproduce a similar 
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model in Figure 3.1 of this chapter while comparing support for the constitution to other 
forms of integration as well. This next section outlines the differences and similarities 
between the TCE and the ToL and details the datasets and questions used to determine 
the nature of citizen discontent. When identifying each question used to measure changes 
made by the treaty, I assign a variable name in brackets, for example the measure for 
support of increased Commission powers is labeled „Commission‟. 
 
The Euro – Deepening 
There are clear distinctions in the literature between support for the EU versus 
enlargement or the Euro (Aarts and van der Kolk 2006). As with the general EU support 
questions described below, the evaluation of attitudes toward the single currency through 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) is a standard question asked in Eurobarometers 
since the 1970s. 
- The Euro: EB69.2 “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? 
Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: A 
European Monetary Union with one single currency, the euro” (European 
Commission 2011a): „Euro‟ 
 
Enlargement – Widening 
Questions in the Eurobarometers ask citizens in the current member states how they feel 
about membership of each of new candidate countries as well as enlargement in general. 
Questions measuring membership of new countries in the Union are as follows: 
 43 
Chapter 3    
- General enlargement: EB67.2 “What is your opinion on each of the following 
statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against 
it: Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years” 
(European Commission 2012c): „Enlargement‟ 
- Specific enlargement: EB69.2 “For each of the following countries and 
territories, would you be in favor or against it becoming part of the European 
Union in the future? Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Croatia, 
Turkey” (European Commission 2011a): „Macedonia‟, „Croatia‟, and 
„Turkey‟ 
 
The EU in General – Integration in General 
Measurements of preference in standard Eurobarometer surveys which allow for an 
evaluation of general EU support across all member states over time include questions 
related to the perception of benefit for one‟s country, feelings that the EU is generally 
good or bad (already used in Chapter 2 for comparison to treaty support measure), 
satisfaction with the direction of the EU, and perception of the image of the EU, and one 
which is ignored by the literature the shift toward political union. The following will be 
analyzed: 
- Benefit of EU membership: EB69.2 “Taking everything into account, would 
you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a 
member of the European Union?” (European Commission 2011a): „Benefit‟ 
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- The EU is good: EB69.2 “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR 
COUNTRY)‟s membership of the European Union would be...? A Good/Bad 
Thing” (European Commission 2011a): „Good‟ 
- Satisfaction with the EU direction: EB69.2 “At the present time, would you 
say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong 
direction, in the European Union?” (European Commission 2011a): 
„Direction‟ 
- Image of the EU: EB69.2 “In general, does the European Union conjure up for 
you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral fairly negative or very negative 
image?” (European Commission 2011a): „Image‟ 
- Political Union: EB66.1 “Are you, yourself, for or against the development 
towards a European political union?” (European Commission 2012b): 
„Political‟ 
 
On Treaty Changes (TCE vs. ToL) – Deepening 
So, is the ToL really so different from the TCE or was it simply changed in such a way to 
avoid the same issues with ratification? Details regarding these changes are necessary for 
this analysis in order to determine, if citizens were given the opportunity to vote on the 
ToL, and assuming knowledge of these changes, whether they would have accepted it or 
not. Furthermore, by providing details of the changes brought about by the ToL, I will 
demonstrate the degree to which the treaty shifts the EU and its institutions ever closer to 
a political union with fixed values. The following outlines the main changes made by the 
two treaties where they differ and the extent of their similarities. 
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Differences 
The most important difference between the TCE and the ToL is the form of these two 
documents. While many of the institutional changes proposed by the treaties are similar, 
the ToL simply amends existing treaties while the TCE was meant to replace the 
elaborate documents which came before it. The EU‟s stated intentions in the drafting of 
the Constitution and the subsequent ToL were to simplify the instruments used to guide 
its actions as well as improve transparency and efficiency of the Union. 
The replacement of previous treaties with the TCE may have achieved this goal. 
However, in the case of the ToL the amending document contained 272 pages and 
applied modifications to the two main governing EU treaties, themselves totaling 331 
pages. Critics of the document argue that the treaty is neither efficient nor transparent 
instead that it is lengthy and “Rather than simplify foreign policymaking, the Lisbon 
Treaty has created an institutional hydra with growing numbers of appendages 
responsible for different aspects of the foreign policy toolbox” (McNamara 2010: 2). No 
consolidated version was available until after all states had signed the treaty at the 
European Council, only then was the first version released in May of 2008. When the 
newly consolidated versions of the TEU and the TFEU treaties were released in March 
2010, the document by no means simplified prior treaties but instead it contained 408 
pages including annexes and protocols.
18
 
The second distinction between the treaties is the removal of symbolic elements 
from the original document including removal of constitutional language and the title 
                                                 
18
 This research will not examine whether complexity of the treaty was intended to confuse elites voting on 
the treaty in each member state, yet it should be kept in mind as a possible explanation for why elites had 
little difficulty pushing it through European Council, National Parliaments and a second  referendum in 
Ireland. 
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„constitution‟. This facilitated the adoption of the treaty through parliamentary 
ratification rather than referenda. Furthermore, elements such as the mention of the EU 
flag and anthem were also excluded from the reform text. 
These components, although they have no extensively legal importance to the 
treaty, were intended to create a European identity that would be entrenched in the legal 
documents of the Union. The exclusion of such elements suggests an aspect of the 
original form removed in order to ensure the success of the treaty‟s adoption by all 
member states (Kurpas 2007, Van den Brink and van Keulen 2007). However, the 
deepening effects of the treaty remain intact; influence on national law-making and 
policy implementation are increased, preserving its essence as a constitution-like treaty. 
 
Similarities 
Although the difference between the TCE and the ToL seem to have led to the successful 
adoption of the ToL (i.e. the term constitution), the similarities between the documents 
are more extensive. The two treaties when examined side by side display substantively 
the same changes with entire passages in the ToL taken directly from the TCE. These 
passages often have only a few words that have changed and in no way affect the 
substance of the treaties‟ articles. The changes prescribed by the treaties are broad. 
Nonetheless, in this project I outline those with the greatest impact on institutional 
deepening of the EU prior to analyzing citizen support for each of them. 
These changes can be grouped into seven categories as follows: the conferral of 
legal personality upon the EU; creation of the position of High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (named Foreign Minister in the TCE); formation of a 
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new European External Action Service (EEAS); implementation of voting changes in the 
European Parliament (EP) and in the Council of the European Union; elevation of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights to legal status; and creation of the position of permanent 
European Council President (Official Journal of the European Union 2007). Each 
category is explained followed by a listing of questions from the Eurobarometers that will 
be used to measure citizen support during negotiation and ratification of the ToL (i.e. 
2007-2009). 
 
1. Legal Personality 
The EU is given legal personality, combining the European Community (under the TEEC 
renamed the TFEU by the ToL) with the European Union (under the TEU) as one entity. 
Previously the competences outlined in the TEEC and the TEU were separate, meaning 
that institutions functioned differently in different policy areas depending on which of the 
two treaties they were found in (Papier 2008). Under the ToL, increased competences of 
the European Union gives the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European 
Commission increased powers in the area of justice and home affairs by 2014 (also 
known as freedom, security and justice). This change abolishes the original three pillars 
of the EU that were largely divided based on policy areas. 
The first pillar involved those policy areas covered under the original TEEC, the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), the common market as well as policies such as 
employment, education, health, consumer protection, social policy, immigration, asylum, 
and border control (EU-Oplysningen 2012). The areas under this first pillar were 
previously the only areas under control at the EU level and any laws created at this level 
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were binding on member states. The second pillar included intergovernmental 
cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy and the third pillar, also related to 
intergovernmental cooperation, included police and judicial affairs (European Union 
Committee 2008). The abolishment of the pillar structure in essence means the EU, 
through both the ECJ and the Commission, has increased and more streamlined 
supranational involvement in more policy areas including employment, social rights, 
economic growth, organized crime, terrorism, and health. 
I order to measure the support for assignment of legal personality to the EU, we 
must assume that individuals with greater trust for the Commission will faithfully accept 
that this institution be assigned more power and influence in the EU. In order to establish 
citizen support for the changes under this category, this study will evaluate attitudes as 
follows: 
- Increased European Commission Power – Evaluated by examining the level of 
trust citizens feel for this institution: EB71.1 “For each of the following 
European bodies, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: the 
European Commission” (European Commission 2011b): „Commission‟ 
- Involvement in more policy areas: EB71.3 “For each of the following areas, 
please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a 
European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place 
at a European level?: Fighting unemployment, protecting social rights, 
ensuring economic growth, fighting organized crime, fighting terrorism, 
managing major health issues” (European Commission 2012c): 
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„Employment‟, „Social Rights‟, „Economic Growth‟, „Organized Crime‟, 
„Terrorism‟, and „Health‟ 
 
2. High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
Creation of the position of High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (named Foreign Minister in the TCE). This individual is responsible for 
maintaining consistency and coherence in EU foreign and defense policy and 
representing the EU in all matters of foreign affairs. They work in collaboration with the 
permanent EC president and are assisted by the European External Action Service 
providing the EU with one voice on behalf of all member states in areas of foreign 
affairs. Furthermore, with the ToL the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
become the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). 
This new policy is coordinated through the new HR and includes a broader range 
of common defense strategies than the previous ESDP. There are some concerns that a 
new position of HR “might lead to an „intergovernmentalisation‟ of the Commission‟s 
external competences, or – on the contrary – to the „communitarisation‟ of the (CSDP)” 
(Kurpas 2007). In other words, the worry is that increased control over previously 
national policy areas will be delegated to the supranational level. 
Citizen attitudes toward the creation of a position of HR are measured based on 
whether they agree or disagree with the following: 
- Creation of position of High Representative: EB67.2 “The European Union 
should have its own Foreign Minister who can be the spokesperson for a 
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common European Union position” (European Commission 2009a): „Foreign 
Minister‟ 
- Common policy: EB67.2 “What is your opinion on each of the following 
statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against 
it: A common defense and security policy among EU Member States” 
(European Commission 2009a): „Defense‟ 
 
3. European External Action Service 
The ToL commissions the formation of a new European External Action Service (EEAS) 
that works in collaboration with member state diplomatic services. The EEAS is 
responsible for development and foreign aid and the coordination of these policies 
between the member states of the EU. Represented by the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EEAS is also responsible for preparing policy 
proposals related to the EU‟s external actions and implementing these policies once they 
are approved. This new institutional body is entrusted to act on behalf of and monitor the 
external actions of all member states. 
According to the EEAS website: “The EU‟s external policies, strategies, 
instruments and missions – overseen by the European External Action Service – have 
four key aims. They support stability, promote human rights and democracy, seek to 
spread prosperity, and support the enforcement of the rule of law and good governance. 
The policy mix is vast, ranging from bilateral agreements to guidelines and legislation” 
(Europa.eu 2012a). The implications of this change to the EU are increased EU control 
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over foreign policy, defense and security policy, as well as increased involvement in the 
promotion of democracy and peace outside its borders. 
Citizen preferences for treaty changes in this category are based on responses to 
the following questions: 
- Common policy: EB67.2 “What is your opinion on each of the following 
statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against 
it: A common foreign policy among the Member States of the EU, towards 
other countries” (European Commission 2009a): „Foreign‟ 
- Promote democracy and peace: EB71.3 “For each of the following areas, 
please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a 
European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place 
at a European level? Promoting democracy and peace in the world” (European 
Commission 2012c): „Democracy‟ 
 
4. Voting – European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
Implementation of voting changes in the European Parliament (EP) and in the Council of 
the European Union give the EP greater legislative power and the Council superior 
involvement in more policy areas. The European Parliament is directly elected by 
member state citizens since 1979. With the ToL, now 750 members are responsible to 
approve legislation proposed by the Commission. As a result of the ToL, the majority of 
laws within the EU are now subject to the ordinary legislative procedure through co-
decision and qualified majority voting (QMV). 
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Previously under the Treaty of Nice, the QMV was reached when member states 
representing 62 percent of the EU population voted. According to the ToL, in October 
2014 the new voting system will come into effect. This new system ensures that “The 
qualified majority can only be reached if it represents at least 55 percent of the States of 
the Union and 65 percent of the European population” (Europa.eu 2012b). Co-decision, 
also now expanded through the ordinary legislative procedure, entails that the European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union have the same weight in the adoption 
of laws. Legislation under this procedure includes “economic governance, immigration, 
energy, transport, the environment and consumer protection” (European Parliament 
2011). 
 The Council of the European Union is different from the European Council. 
Formerly named the Council of Ministers, it is commonly referred to as “the Council.” 
This institution is composed of Ministers from every member state who meet in different 
configurations based on the topic of the meeting. The Council maintains six month 
rotating presidencies in the various configurations except in Foreign Affairs which are 
now presided over by the High Representative. Decisions in the Council are also made by 
qualified majority. Changes in the voting system diminish the influence of member states 
with smaller populations and increase the influence of larger members. For instance, the 
UK will go from 8 percent to 12 percent of the share of the vote in the Council. 
Furthermore, European Parliament is given more power “as an equal co-legislator in 
many policy areas” (Kurpas 2007: 9). 
Attitudes toward voting changes in the Council and the European Parliament are 
evaluated using a measure of citizen trust for the two institutions in general. The logical 
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step made here, as for the Commission, implies that individuals with greater trust for the 
Council or the EP will faithfully accept that these institutions more power and influence 
in the EU: 
- Increased institutional power from voting changes – Evaluated by examining 
the level of trust citizens feel for these institution: EB69.2 “And, for each of 
them (European bodies), please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to 
trust it: The European Parliament „Parliament‟, The Council of the European 
Union” (European Commission 2011a): „Council‟ 
 
5. Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights in the ToL, although it is not entrenched in the treaty 
as it would have been in the TCE, is given the “same legal value as the Treaties,” namely 
as the TEU and the TFEU (Official Journal of the European Union 2007). Any violations 
of this Charter in any of the member states are therefore under the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice (except where opt-outs were negotiated). 
Support for the EU‟s elevation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to legal 
status is measured using citizen opinion on the role of the EU in promoting and 
protecting these rights, as would be ensured by the Charter: 
- Charter of Fundamental Rights: EB68.2 “For each of the following areas, 
please tell me if you believe that more or less decision-making should take 
place at a European level: Promoting and protecting fundamental rights, 
including children‟s rights” (European Commission 2010): „Charter‟ 
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6. Permanent European Council President 
Since the ToL and the creation of a now “permanent” European Council President, the 
position is held for a two and a half year term which is renewable once and this person is 
elected by the European Council (EC) through qualified majority. Previously the 
presidency was held for a six months on a rotational basis. The EC was first established 
in 1974 and is composed of heads of state or government of each of the member states of 
the European Union. As a result of the ToL, the EC is, for the first time, considered an 
institution of the EU. The European Council meets twice every six months or more if 
convened by the president for a special session. The members are responsible for general 
policy making, where votes are made by qualified majority, and treaty changes, where 
decisions are made by unanimity. The EC President is responsible for moving issues 
forward in the EC, convening and chairing meetings. This person cannot hold national 
office while they are president. 
 The impact of making EC presidency “permanent” is greater consistency in the 
direction of decisions made through this institution. Criticisms include the concern that 
such a role was designed to push integration forward through the EC. Additionally, there 
are fears that the new presidency‟s addresses to the EP will become more than just 
informative, that they will shift to influential normative claims over the direction the 
European Parliament “should” take. Finally, critics have argued that the new president 
will become the “face” of all member states in Foreign Affairs, perhaps even competing 
with the new role of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(Kaczyński and ó Broin 2009). 
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Although this is an important change and for full recognition of the depth of 
integration created by the ToL it could not be left out of the treaty changes overview. 
Unfortunately, there are no questions in any of the Eurobarometers to measure support 
for a permanent European Council president. 
 
The Treaty in General – Deepening 
As I have demonstrated, through review of Flash Eurobarometers and overview of the 
literature, although citizens may respond that they are in favor of the treaty, this statement 
is subject to substantial interpretation by the respondent on what is included in the treaty. 
The changes outlined above are inclusive of many different policy areas and EU 
institutions while a few of the most significant of these changes that result from points 2 
and 3 above are those that deepen the powers of the union and shift the regional 
integration scheme ever closer to a political union. According to El-Agraa (1994), the 
political union “moves beyond economic union to supranational decision-making beyond 
purely economic; a political union is the ultimate goal of the movement toward European 
unity” (Gilpin 2001: 343), one that is materializing through the adoption of the ToL. 
The most instrumental changes in this shift are the coordination at the 
supranational level of foreign policy „Foreign‟, defense and security policy „Defense‟, 
and the creation of a single public character and voice of the EU on foreign policy 
„Foreign Minister‟. In the previous chapter, I used a constructed measure of support for 
the treaty based on these most significant changes. Opposition to the changes listed are 
combined for establishment of TCE and ToL support using data from EB63.4 and 
EB67.2. The formula for this measure is as follows: „Treaty‟ = „Foreign‟ + „Defense‟ + 
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„Foreign Minister‟. Support for the treaty requires support for all three of the variables 
composing the measure. In other words, a pro-ToL response is observed when an 
individual is in favor of the creation of a common foreign policy, a common defense 
policy, and the creation of a position of Foreign Minister of the EU. 
I also include the variable „constitution‟ as an alternative measure of support for 
the ToL, the same indicator as Milner (2006) uses to evaluate support for the TCE. The 
questions I is:  
-  “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for 
each statement, whether you are for it or against it: A constitution for the 
European Union” (European Commission 2009a): „Constitution‟ 
 
The Nature of Opposition – Analysis 
The most common distinction is along state lines, more specifically based on old 
versus new member states. These studies can take the form of comparing the six original 
member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands) to some 
or all of the newer states (Denmark, Greece, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Portugal, 
Finland, Sweden, Austria, Spain) forming the first fifteen members (McLaren 2002), 
these are called here EU6 and EU9. The final enlargement group is hereafter referred to 
as EU12 and consists of the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia that joined in 2004, and Bulgaria, and 
Romania that joined in 2007. The differences between state groupings along these lines 
are assumed to be grounded in the Europeanization of national traditions through 
extended exposure to the EU (Risse 2001). This „socialization‟ of the EU (Hosli and 
 57 
Chapter 3    




Further state-level comparisons include shared borders
20
 (McLaren 2002), the size 
of the welfare state (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), the North-South geographical 
positioning of states, population size, political ideology, and the size of the state‟s 
contribution to the EU budget (OPTEM 2001). I will explain these additional state-level 
distinctions further in Chapter 4 as potential explanatory factors. 
To establish the nature of citizens‟ discontent, I first examine the variation in 
responses to integration questions as defined above in France, the Netherlands and 
Ireland that experienced failed referenda on the TCE or the ToL. This allows me to 
confirm whether the literature that focused so heavily on why referenda failed in these 
countries is reflected in the Eurobarometer questions under investigation in this study. I 
use multiple Eurobarometers at various different time points from the period immediately 
following rejection of the TCE leading up to the ToL‟s entry into force in December 
2009 in order to capture these various questions. Table 3.1 provides details on the citizen 
responses in the three countries. The values provided represent the average responses of 
individuals in favor of the integration change listed in the first column. Section totals 
                                                 
19
 A comparison of means test in both the EB69.2 (2008) and EVS (2008) confirms that EU6 member states 
are significantly (with 95 percent confidence) more European than EU9 and EU12 members. This test 
demonstrates that individuals in original member states self-identify as European more so than in later 
enlargement groups. 
20
 Review of Eurobarometer datasets revealed that EB31 used by Gabel (1998) contained a “frontier zone” 
variable. This variable is was since dropped from the EB coding schemes and it can only be assumed that 
McLaren later modeled the border variable in EB47.1 using cross reference to the variable “province.” For 
the purpose of reproduction of Gabel and McLaren‟s study, it is not possible to draw on the border or 
province variables have now both been dropped from EB coding, replaced by a “region” variable which, 
according to the earliest EB of this study “(Region) may have changed compared to former Eurobarometer 
up to survey 61”(European Commission 2012a). These discrepancies in coding between each of the eight 
datasets of this study, makes the task of determining border regions outside the scope of this analysis. 
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represent the average degree of support for that type of integration change within each 
country.
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On Treaty Changes* 72.59 66.07 72.48
1. Legal Personality 72.48 62.39 72.60
Commission 38.84 43.00 60.54
Employment 67.33 59.21 56.67
Social Rights 68.72 61.23 62.47
Economic Growth 78.24 67.61 71.51
Organized Crime 87.04 69.39 92.84
Terrorism 89.65 74.00 91.33
Health 77.52 62.26 72.83
3. High Representative 84.15 78.32 80.18
Foreign Minister 81.48 82.71 78.06
Defence 86.81 73.93 82.29
4. European External Action Service 82.55 78.20 74.78
Foreign 76.25 81.51 70.44
Democracy 88.84 74.89 79.12
5. Voting Changes 44.67 57.13 55.96
Parliament 50.48 63.05 59.27
Council 38.85 51.20 52.64
6. Charter of Fundamental Rights 79.10 54.30 78.90
Charter 79.10 54.30 78.90
The Treaty in General* 70.70 72.88 56.16
Constitution 76.47 79.79 57.47
Treaty 64.92 65.96 54.86
The Euro 70.48 86.85 78.67
Euro 70.48 86.85 78.67
Enlargement* 31.35 41.52 48.04
Enlargement 31.55 50.42 45.95
Macedonia 32.60 40.44 51.39
Croatia 43.37 46.51 57.35
Turkey 17.88 28.69 37.46
The EU in General* 44.58 63.97 55.84
Benefit 47.40 81.97 69.45
Good 46.35 72.51 73.49
Direction 33.08 46.02 44.19
Image 47.50 65.44 42.08













Variation in Nature of EU Support in Countries with Failed Referenda (on ToL and TCE)
2006-2009 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)
Sources: 
66.1 European Values and Societal Issues, Mobile Phone Use, and Farm Animal Welfare, September-October 2006 N=26,647
67.2 European Union Enlargement, Personal Data Privacy, the National Economy, and Scientific Research, April-May 2007 N=26,717
68.2 European Union Policy and Decision Making, Corruption, Civil Justice, E-Communications, Agriculture, and Environmental Protection, November 2007-January 2008  
N=26,730
69.2 National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March-May 2008 N=26,661
71.1 European Parliament and Elections, Economic Crisis, Climate Change, and Chemical Products, January-February 2009 N=26,718
71.3 Globalization, Personal Values and Priorities, European Identity, Future of the European Union, Social Problems and Welfare, and European Elections, June-July, 2009 





























Table 3.1 – Variation in Nature of EU Support – Countries with Failed Referenda 
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Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca (2008) conclude that in both the Netherlands and France, 
opposition was greater to enlargement than to the constitutional treaty. I examine here 
whether this is still the case for the ToL. Aarts and van der Kolk (2006) support this 
claim for the Netherlands and suggest opposition to the Euro is also higher than to the 
constitution. According to this table, in France support for the treaty is rather high across 
all the individual changes contained within it. The results demonstrate that French 
citizens are generally in favor of the creation of a legal personality of the Union, the 
implementation of a position of High Representative, creation of a European External 
Action Service, and promotion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU to legal 
status. Citizens, however, are somewhat more skeptical of voting changes which would 
give greater powers to the European Parliament and to the Council of the European 
Union. This result is reflected in low levels of trust for these institutions (50.48 percent 
trust the EP, and 38.85 trusts the Council). 
Within the category legal personality, although highly in favor of increased 
involvement of the EU in national policy areas, French citizens demonstrate low levels of 
trust for the European Commission. With low levels of trust for the Commission (38.84 
percent) I assume that citizens will be less likely to support this institution acquiring 
greater power in the area of justice and home affairs. These results are supported by 
OPTEM (2001) report findings wherein citizen criticisms of the EU in France are largely 
due to the perception of an overinflated bureaucracy. When compared to enlargement, the 
findings of the literature on the TCE reiterated above are reaffirmed for the ToL. Citizens 
are on average only 31.35 percent in favor of enlargement. On the membership of Turkey 
in particular, the French are only 17.88 percent in favor.  
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Milner (2006) suggests rather, that French voters were not pro-Union but anti-
Constitution and anti-Turkey. As presented, anti-enlargement sentiment in this country is 
rather high with the most enlargement opposition on the question of Turkey. With regard 
to a pro-Constitution versus pro-EU in general divide, in the ToL context, general Union 
support in France is very low. The average score on the five general support measures is 
44.58 percent and below 50 percent for all composing questions, with the greatest 
skepticism found on the question of whether the EU is going generally in the right 
direction. In other words, citizens tend to feel that changes, perhaps such as the 
negotiation and signature of the ToL, are not moving in the direction of their choosing. 
This, however, could also be due to the enlargement skepticism as well. Thus a general 
question of EU direction cannot provide much in terms of conclusive understanding of 
the nature of discontent in France. Therefore, the results provided support the argument 
that a failed referendum on the TCE in France was not necessarily due to opposition to a 
constitution. This is further corroborated by the contradictory findings of the literature 
(i.e. Milner‟s “YES to the Union,NO to the Constitution” versus Ruiz-Jiménez‟s “no to 
enlargement, YES to the Constitution”). 
In France, support for the treaty on both my treaty measures (the „constitution‟ 
and the constructed „treaty‟ measure) averages 70.70 percent, and sits at 72.59 percent on 
the average support across all treaty changes. On the other hand, individual ToL changes 
demonstrate support as low as 38.84 percent on trust in the Commission, 38.85 percent 
on trust for the Council. I find similar results in the case of the Netherlands. 
 On the Euro, it seems that Aarts and van der Kolk‟s (2006) conclusion that the 
Dutch voted against the single currency rather than against the constitution does not hold 
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in the context of the ToL. This may be indicative of a rise in pro-Euro sentiment since the 
failed TCE referenda. Although I can reject Aarts and van der Kolk‟s findings on the 
Euro versus the constitution distinction, conclusions on anti-enlargement sentiment 
(Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca 2008) remain valid. Although not as low as France, the 
Netherlands demonstrate 50.42 percent support for enlargement in general. When asked 
about specific countries this rate drops slightly, for Turkey it reaches as low as 28.69 
percent pro-enlargement. 
The Netherlands displays similar opposition as the French on individual treaty 
changes, yet on questions of institutional trust, where I deduce support for increased 
institutional powers, I find that the Dutch are less distrustful than the French on each the 
Commission (43 percent), the European Parliament (63.05 percent) and the Council (51.2 
percent). Contrary to France, the Dutch are less supportive of EU involvement in 
employment policy (59.21) and the elevation of the charter to legal status (54.3). Finally, 
on the EU in general, the Dutch demonstrate high rates of support averaging 63.97 
percent. Highest is the sense that EU membership has been beneficial for the Dutch. On 
the direction of the EU, citizens of the Netherlands like the French, seem disappointed 
with the steps being taken in building the Union. As with the French findings, it is 
difficult to qualify this result as the question is so general. 
 Finally, in the post-referendum survey for the Netherlands, the largest anti-
Constitution votes were based on lack of knowledge of treaty changes and a fear for the 
loss of national sovereignty. According to this, I would expect that questions relating to 
the attribution of legal personality to the Union, increased power in policy areas, and 
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increased institutional powers, should have much lower Dutch support. The lowest 
support levels are found only on the Commission (under legal personality).  
 According to the Flash Eurobarometer conducted in Ireland following the first 
ToL referendum, the anti-treaty vote was based on opposition to political parties in 
Ireland at the time (European Commission 2009b). I would expect therefore, that support 
for constitutional changes and the EU in general should be rather high, especially 
considering the successful ratification of the treaty in the second referendum. The results 
of Table 3.2 confirm this expectation. On all treaty changes, where all changes, are 
supported by at least 50 percent. The lowest support is found on the increase in decision-
making powers on social rights (56.67 percent) and trust in the Council (52.64 percent). 
Interestingly, the constitution and treaty measures are both quite low. Although general 
support for EU foreign and defense policy and the creation of position of High 
Representative are separately quite high, the constructed treaty measure indicates that 
individuals who are in favor of these changes are not in favor of all of them 
simultaneously. In essence, only 54.86 percent of citizens in Ireland would be 
simultaneously in favor of a common EU foreign policy, EU defense policy and the 
creation of the position of High Representative. 
Findings vary considerably between studies based on the question under 
investigation and the way the question is measured, for instance studies of TCE support 
measure support for the constitution either through Flash Eurobarometer data (European 
Commission 2005), Standard Eurobarometer (Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca 2008), or 
even on privately commissioned polls (Milner 2006). In order to investigate support for 
the very similar ToL, it is necessary to build on these variations by further qualifying the 
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nature of public support for different types of integration across member states. Table 3.2 
provides the variation across the different forms of integration as presented in 3.1 for all 
EU members combined (EU27), and for the three main membership groups (EU6, EU9, 
EU12).
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On Treaty Changes 71.53 74.31 66.68 73.79
1. Legal Personality 71.54 74.20 66.25 74.17
Commission 47.74 48.58 45.07 49.33
Employment 65.56 67.71 58.41 69.85
Social Rights 68.21 71.54 59.80 72.86
Economic Growth 74.92 77.67 68.31 78.49
Organized Crime 82.88 87.08 79.47 83.34
Terrorism 86.18 88.15 82.00 88.33
Health 75.26 78.66 70.70 76.98
3. High Representative 81.12 83.79 73.42 85.56
Foreign Minister 77.65 80.60 71.47 80.81
Defence 84.59 86.99 75.36 90.31
4. European External Action Service 82.12 82.89 77.52 85.18
Foreign 79.26 79.94 73.02 83.60
Democracy 84.98 85.84 82.02 86.76
5. Voting Changes 51.91 51.99 49.23 53.87
Parliament 56.42 56.95 54.70 57.44
Council 47.40 47.02 43.76 50.30
6. Charter of Fundamental Rights 70.99 78.67 66.98 70.15
Charter 70.99 78.67 66.98 70.15
The Treaty in General 69.88 71.77 61.08 75.52
Constitution 75.26 77.26 66.51 80.81
Treaty 64.50 66.27 55.66 70.24
The Euro 63.55 73.76 58.72 62.08
Euro 63.55 73.76 58.72 62.08
Enlargement 46.63 36.11 42.75 54.79
Enlargement 54.25 37.65 46.86 68.09
Macedonia 44.61 36.39 41.62 50.96
Croatia 55.66 45.85 52.01 63.29
Turkey 31.99 24.53 30.51 36.83
The EU in General 52.83 51.57 48.74 56.53
Benefit 60.06 57.46 58.45 62.57
Good 52.81 59.20 50.81 51.11
Direction 45.40 38.22 41.62 51.84
Image 48.28 48.35 44.75 50.90
Political 57.59 54.63 48.06 66.22
Eurobarometer Sources: 66.1  N=26,647; 67.2 N=26,717; 68.2 N=26,730; 69.2 N=26,661; 71.1 N=26,718; 71.3 N=26,830
Variation in Nature of EU Support Across all Member States
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The conclusions from Table 3.1 suggested that support for the treaty is highest in EU12 
countries and lowest in EU9. This finding contradicts the literature that indicates highest 
support among original members. With this finding in mind, I turn to the evaluation of 
Table 3.2. The literature had proposed highest support among original EU members 
which was then contradicted in the data of Table 3.1. What is observed in these more 
precise data on the specific nature of discontent is in fact, when including all treaty 
changes, support is indeed highest among EU6 members (74.31 percent). This rate of 
support is very similar to that of EU12 members (73.79). The factors which divide 
slightly higher support in the EU6 versus EU12 countries are scores on the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Scores on Legal Personality, High Representative, European 
External Action Service, and voting changes are highest in EU12. 
On the EU in general (56.53 percent) and enlargement (54.79 percent), newest 
member states demonstrate the highest support. Finally, on the Euro, the old versus new 
state grouping shows the greatest divisions, where support is highest for old member 
states (73.76 percent), 11 points higher than the newest members (62.08 percent) and 
almost 14 points greater than members of the original enlargements (58.72 percent). 
These data are consistent with Table 3.1 in exposing the highest degree of discontent on 
the question of future enlargement. Yet in order to draw any conclusions on the link 
between treaty rejection and this other integration question, I turn to one final analysis. 
Investigating the trade-off between opposition to the constitutional treaty and some of the 
main integration indicators I can plausibly attribute negative referendum voting to this 
opposition to enlargement. 
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The following graph illustrates the trade-off between support for a constitution 
and support for other forms of integration. Responses are measured using the 
„Constitution‟ question in the Eurobarometer 67.2 (European Commission 2009a). 
Choosing this indicator ensures my evaluation is consistent with previous studies that 
investigate trade-offs between the various forms of integration (Ruiz-Jiménez and 
Torreblanca 2008, Aarts and van der Kolk 2006). The figure examines the tendency to 
support one form of integration when also in favor of a constitution. I modify the model 
used by Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca by examining the tendencies of those opposed to 
the constitution, rather than in favor. Building on their analysis, I examine the 
relationship in the more recent ToL context and include more integration questions. 
While the authors investigated trade-off with enlargement, my measures are 
„Enlargement‟, „Euro‟, „Good‟, and „Treaty‟. Data are reported as percentages 
representing the average pro-integration response.
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Attitudes toward other Forms of Integration among Citizens 
Opposed to an EU Constitution 
Across all Member States 
Source: EB67.2 European Union Enlargement, Personal Data Privacy, the National Economy, and Scientific Research, April-May 2007 
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Figure 3.1 reveals that across all EU member states, citizens who are opposed to a 
constitution are also highly opposed to enlargement. This tendency is greater than on 
attitudes toward treaty changes, the Euro or the EU in general. I find that of those citizens 
who are against the constitution 64.3 percent are also opposed to enlargement, 57.5 
percent are also opposed to the Euro, while on the EU in general and on individual treaty 
changes (according to the constructed measure), more than half are actually in favor. This 
finding helps to confirm that when citizens are voting against a constitution they may not 
actually be basing this vote on opposition to the treaty but rather to something else; in this 
case, enlargement. This final analysis combined with the results of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 
provide clear evidence that enlargement is the form of integration where citizen 
discontent in the EU is the greatest, regardless of length of membership group. 
 
Conclusion – Understanding Integration Preferences 
The analyses in this chapter demonstrate the variations across member states according to 
the nature of the EU question. I find that, regardless of the state grouping applied, 
enlargement is the greatest point of contention among member states. In response to 
previous work on the question of „whether there is a trade-off between deepening and 
widening‟, I explore whether citizens who are anti-constitution are also anti-enlargement. 
The results of this analysis confirm that anti-constitution sentiment is not due to objection 
on the ToL and its content but instead it is most closely linked to anti-enlargement, rather 
than to attitudes on the treaty‟s changes. I conclude thus that negative voting in referenda 
was likely due to this high level of opposition to new member states. 
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Much of the analysis so far has ignored the reasons why citizens are discontent in 
the EU and therefore in Chapter 4 I investigate the various individual factors that 
influence enlargement preferences. Much of the same literature analyzed above provides 
differing hypotheses for why the public are opposed to integration in its various forms. 
Milner (2006) states that in France the direction of public opinion is generally grounded 
in a subjective understanding of what benefits or costs would result from a European 
constitution. Across the EU, the literature explains that fear of other cultures underlies 
much of the opposition to the EU in general. The analysis in Chapter 4 provides an 
overview of all support for integration theories commonly discussed in the literature and 
offers an analysis that establishes which of these play the greatest role in determining 
preferences on the most contentious form of integration: EU enlargement. 
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CHAPTER 4 – UNDERSTANDING CITIZEN OPPOSITION 
Introduction 
The previous chapter revealed the need to examine declining public support in the EU in 
more detail and observe where support is waning. I found that in countries where the 
constitutional treaties were rejected, support for both a constitution and the most 
important changes included in it is quite high. This finding suggests that citizens voting 
against the deepening treaties were likely opposed to something else. I confirm this 
finding and discover that not only were citizens against enlargement but that opposition 
across the member states is highest on this enlargement question. I have compared these 
findings to the literature and observe that, although there are many similarities, there also 
exist discrepancies between my data and other authors‟ conclusions. These 
inconsistencies are mostly due to this difference in qualification of the integration 
question. In addition to contradictions in the literature based on the form of integration 
under investigation, this chapter will explore divergences in terms of what factors play 
the most important role in driving citizen discontent in the Union. I will present the 
common theories of citizen support for integration and through empirical analysis, 
answer RQ4. 
I construct the models
21
 by examining cases from only one Eurobarometer survey 
from 2008 as well as the European Values Study from the same year. In two separate 
analyses I compare theories of support for European integration while including the 
maximum number of explanatory factors drawn from the literature. 
                                                 
21
 Using OLS regression in all cases with standardized beta coefficients, adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
using White corrected standard errors (robust). Standardized coefficients allow me to compare independent 
variables in my study regardless of the units on which these variables are measured. 
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Using the EB, I examine factors driving discontent with the EU in general, 
enlargement, EU institutions, and the treaty in general. Furthermore, using the EVS 
analysis, I focus the investigation on the question of EU enlargement, the most 
contentious of integration changes. I explore through a novel investigation of individual 
values, the role of socio-cultural characteristics on support for integration. Finally using 
these findings, I illustrate which theory of integration support has the greatest predictive 
power. 
 In reviewing the literature on European citizens and their responses to European 
integration a few trends emerge. The first is the level at which observations are made or 
analyses are conducted (state or individual), while the second is the description of the 
calculations assumed to be made by citizens which determine their preferences for 
European integration (utilitarian or socio-cultural). In the next section, I provide an 
overview of the literature which seeks to explain opinion in the EU. I then proceed to 
outline the factors that will be used in my final analyses to explain public support for the 
various forms of integration. 
 
The Calculations Underlying Integration Support Theories 
Existing studies on citizen preferences regarding the European Union compare citizens 
based on a variety of factors. These analyses do this in order to determine which are the 
elements that most affect the decisions made by citizens generally in the case of voting 
for or against the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, on the EU in general, or 
on Union enlargement. Studies propose differences both at the state and the citizen level. 
At the state level, only length of membership is examined in Chapter 3. In this chapter I 
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draw on this factor and include several others identified by the literature as controls 
including population size, net EU budget contribution, state placement on the left-right 
political spectrum, welfare state size, and north-south geographical divide. 
Hosli and Arnold (2010) do not establish a small versus large state cut-off; instead 
they use population size as an independent variable. I too will use population size to 
determine my models and use an arbitrarily determined cut-off for state size explained 
below based on points drawn from the literature. Thorhallson and Wivel (2006) argue 
that using such an arbitrary number to determine state size ignores other important 
elements such as the “quantifiable aspects of power” and the “perception of power” that 
may be considered to classify a state‟s size both in terms of internal capabilities and 
externally in relation to other EU member states and beyond the Union. For the purpose 
of this analysis and comparability with previous studies, I use simply population size. 
Furthermore, I expect that much of the influence that may be exercised as both the 
quantifiable aspects and subjective perceptions of power will be captured through 
variables like the length of membership and the size of budget contributions to the Union. 
Controlling for population size is important due to the decision-making structure 
of the Union, especially post-ToL where the qualified majority voting system (QMV) is 
now applied to more policy areas. “Under Lisbon population size will in turn become the 
primary basis for EU law-making, as in any State with a common citizenry” (Coughlan 
2009). Therefore, any small state-specific interests that may become contentious at the 
EU, if not shared by several other small states or a few large states, will likely be left 
unrepresented. The primary purpose of controlling for population size is therefore to 
isolate any effect of citizens living in states with smaller veto power in the EU: “the 
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QMV method clearly favors the large states to a greater extent than the other two voting 
methods. The population of the large states accounts for more than 70 percent of the 
Union‟s population and therefore it is impossible to form a blocking minority without the 
participation of large states” (Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006: 661). 
 On left-right political placement of member states, left-leaning countries are 
expected to demonstrate lower support levels based on the same reasoning as at the 
individual level explained below (Gabel 1998). According to Hosli and Arnold (2010), 
state level position on the Laver and Benoit scale does not play a significant role in 
determining integration preferences; I will nonetheless include a control for left countries, 
according to the CHES experts‟ classification of states. 
 With regard to budget contributions, Hosli and Arnold (2010) find that greater 
contributors, with higher stakes in the EU economy, are more likely to desire more 
decision-making at the EU level to ensure greater control over the administration and 
redistribution of these funds at the supranational level. A logical counterargument to this 
reasoning, however, is grounded in the utilitarian theory of individual decision-making 
described below, wherein citizens in states who are net beneficiaries of EU funds will 
view their country as benefitting from membership and therefore be more likely to 
support further integration. I thus control for size of budget contributions so that I can 
observe the individual effects regardless of the states‟ financial stance with the EU. 
 The final state-level controls are welfare state size and north-south geographical 
location. McLaren (2002) proposes that individuals who benefit from a larger welfare 
state are less likely to support further integration out of fear that the conservative 
economic policies of the EU will infringe on national welfare policy. Eichenberg and 
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Dalton (2007) likewise propose that support for integration is higher in small welfare 
states. Finally, studies have drawn upon the north-south geographical divide to 
distinguish between preferences. No explanation is provided, however, as to why such an 
arbitrary distinction would affect public opinion (OPTEM 2001).  
 At the individual level, variations are usually observed between citizens based on 
their socioeconomic status and demographic characteristics. These factors are easily 
quantified and have served as the most common explanatory elements for individual 
opinions on the European Union, regardless of the integration question. Gabel (1998), 
who was one of the original contributors to the evaluation of citizen preference studies in 
the EU, examined demographic factors such as age and gender, as well as socioeconomic 
factors like education level, income, and type of employment. He controlled for these in 
order to determine with more certainty which of the common theories of integration 
support were the most reliable in predicting citizen preferences in the EU. Gabel tests 
utilitarian theory against other possible theories including cognitive mobilization, support 
for government, political values, and class partisanship. The utilitarian hypothesis 
suggests that citizens are likely to support or oppose the European Union based on a cost-
benefit analysis and determination of whether economic benefits can be acquired through 
membership. 
 Cognitive mobilization is grounded in “a high level of political awareness and 
well-developed skills in political communication” (Gabel 1998: 335) The theory was 
originally put forth by Ronald Inglehart (1970) who proposed that individuals with 
greater knowledge and understanding of EU issues will be more likely to support them. 
Gabel (1998: 342) operationalizes this hypothesis through measurement of responses to 
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the question: “when you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political 
matters, frequently occasionally, or never?” The findings of his study indicate that across 
all members, those who never discuss politics demonstrate lower levels of support for 
integration, while increased cognitive mobilization has a positive effect on integration 
attitudes only in original member states. 
This is supported by findings of the post-referendum Flash Eurobarometers in the 
Netherlands and Ireland presented in Chapter 3, which suggested that those who voted 
NO to the TCE and ToL did so due to a lack of knowledge of the reforms brought about 
by these treaties. In Ireland, the NO vote also resulted from objection to national political 
parties and government (European Commission 2009b: 18-19). This finding relates to 
Gabel‟s next theory of support for government and party affiliation. 
 On support for national government, Gabel briefly suggests that citizens may be 
voting due to support for the national government of the member state, rather than based 
on any particular EU issue (Gabel 1998: 339). Franklin et al. (1995) tie the outcome of 
referenda to the degree of popularity of the current government, suggesting that a 
population satisfied with government will be unlikely to express negative attitudes 
toward initiatives prompted by this government. 
Party affiliation is similar but relates support to citizens voting based on left-right 
political placement and the typical EU stances of parties on this political spectrum. 
According to this left-right dichotomy, Left leaning citizens should be less supportive of 
integration than citizens with inclinations toward parties on the right of the political 
spectrum. This resistance on the Left is due to “perception that integration is a 
manifestation of capitalist forces” (Gabel 1998: 338). In other words, supporters of left 
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leaning parties will likely back their policies and see the EU as potentially infringing on 
the ability of national governments to maintain a strong welfare state. 
 Finally, the author tests political and economic value orientations to determine 
their role in defining public opinion. These are based on a classification of citizens on a 
materialist/post-materialist measure. Gabel concluded: “the utilitarian theory is the 
strongest and most robust predictor of support for integration. It is also worth noting that, 
in addition to having limited applicability, the cognitive mobilization and political values 
theories have a relatively small impact on support” (Gabel 1998: 352). The use of 
political and economic values here is limited in the sense that they provide a dichotomy 
based on responses to four possible questions: “maintaining order (a); giving people more 
say in important government decisions (b); fighting rising prices (c); protecting freedom 
of speech (d)” (342). Where responses were (a) or (c), respondents were considered 
materialists, while (b) and (d) were counted as post-materialists. 
Although this use of values is beneficial for understanding the ideals underlying 
citizen calculations, the use of so few factors is rather limiting. Much of the debate in the 
literature concerning value diversity and political unity states in one way or another that 
“cultural homogeneity is…regarded as a prerequisite for political integration, which in 
turn is a prerequisite for political stability, especially in democracies”(Lijphart 1971: 5). 
The issues which arise thus are the definition of the link between culture and values, and 
the identification of which values are most important, or required for political unity. 
 The socio-cultural explanation of attitudes suggests that individuals‟ preferences 
are shaped by the values acquired through their environment. This setting may be defined 
by the culture to which an individual is born wherein shared experience and interactions 
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create predispositions to certain preferences (Jacob 1964). Lijphart (1971: 14) establishes, 
through review of much of the values and cultural diversity literature, that some values 
may be detrimental to integration while others may not be. He does not provide any 
conclusive evidence as to which values play roles in promoting or disintegrating political 
unity. In his concluding remarks he states that further research should do more than 
evaluate cleavages based on simple value differences between groups. He proposes that 
the “depth and intensity” of these variations should be explored. 
Bovenberg (2003: 418), through analysis of the European Values Study, also 
identifies the need for further examination of which values are more likely to influence 
support for European integration. He states: “The key question that arises…is which 
common core public values are required for successful European integration and in which 
areas the various countries and regions can retain and even strengthen their own specific 
cultural heritage.” As will be explained below, to a certain extent my work will do 
exactly this. 
 Several studies have reproduced and built upon Gabel‟s findings to evaluate the 
role of various public support theories by incorporating additional explanatory variables. 
Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) do so by comparing the strong impact of utilitarian factors 
on different types of EU policies. By evaluating the preferences for EU involvement in 
policy areas, analysis sought to determine whether support for the EU was based on 
national traditions and the desire to protect social and health programs. The authors 
explain that following Maastricht in 1991, support for the EU began to decline. In France, 
as one of the larger welfare states, opposition to the EU was based on the perception of 
intrusion into social security and health policy. Therefore, as confirmed in the previous 
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chapter, the size of a welfare state determines preferences because of the desire by 
individuals to protect existing social programs. In other words, citizens of large welfare 
states are more likely to be fearful that further integration would endanger their current 
benefits, confirming the utilitarian hypothesis of integration support.  
 McLaren (2002) reproduces Gabel‟s study with more recent data and includes 
some questions on the nature of citizens‟ fears in the EU. She offers the hypothesis that 
through citizens‟ “fear of other cultures” and not economic self-interest, they are less 
likely to support further integration. This proposal was put forth as an alternative to 
Gabel‟s conclusion that citizen opinion is driven primarily by utilitarian calculations. She 
proposes that those who have less tolerance of other cultures are less supportive of 
integration. 
McLaren‟s study provides a clear prediction of socio-demographic factors that 
would influence support for integration in general based on analysis of 15 member states 
prior to the 2004 enlargement. She argues that variations may be found within old versus 
young member states, for instance, citizens in France with higher education and income 
will be more supportive of integration. On the other hand, within the same country, 
manual workers demonstrate less support for further EU integration. According to her 
study, more support for integration is found among more highly educated populations, 
with higher incomes, or living in EU border regions. 
Increased support will also be noted among professionals in older states and 
executives in younger states. In contrast to the utilitarian hypothesis, she proposes that 
EU opposition may be grounded in a “general fear of the degradation of one‟s culture and 
one‟s nation that leads some to be hostile toward the EU” (McLaren 2002: 559). In other 
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words, those who are generally intolerant of other cultures are more likely to be skeptical 
of the benefits of the EU, based on views that minorities either abuse social benefits or 
that their religious practices threaten the way of life of the majority. Her analysis 
concludes by stating that non-economic factors (herein called socio-cultural factors), such 
as the perception of threat to one‟s culture, are equally influential as socio-economic 
factors. Her study makes no distinction between types of integration. She employs the 
same variables as used in my previous chapter for support for the EU in general.  
 Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca (2008) build on the perception of fears with regard 
to the loss of culture by including an examination of other perceived threats resulting 
from new incoming member citizens. The impact of enlargement is measured through 
examination of the effect on perceived functionality of an enlarged union, the potential 
for collapse of EU institutions, and the cost of integration in terms of trade, investments, 
budgetary contributions and job creation or loss. The authors contend that perceptions of 
cost at the individual level are based on self-interest and can be translated into certain 
quantifiable fears. These fears can include fear for the loss of jobs and labor declines, the 
increase in price competitions, increased state budgetary contributions, the loss of social 
benefits, loss of power for small states, and the fear of increased drug trafficking between 
member states. The authors demonstrate that French citizens, as part the older members 
of the EU, demonstrate fears for the transfer of jobs to cheaper labor countries, followed 
by fear of price competition on agriculture and increases in budgetary contributions to the 
EU. 
 Other research confirms this departure from the purely utilitarian hypothesis of 
integration support and through examination of the fear citizens‟ display in the face of 
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opening their borders to other cultures. Kehrberg (2007) examines economic factors that 
affect attitudes toward immigration in Western Europe and finds, much like attitudes 
toward general integration, the forces driving acceptance of integration with other 
cultures are grounded in values of tolerance. 
 Aarts and van der Kolk (2006) similarly diverge from the utilitarian theory of 
support by investigating whether citizens instead fear the loss of their own culture 
through further integration. In their analysis, they build on Gabel‟s findings of the 
influence of party affiliation and sought to explain whether this affiliation influenced the 
negative referendum outcome in the Netherlands. The authors demonstrate that rather 
than party affiliation, utilitarian calculations linked to the potential threat to Dutch jobs as 
well as claims of undervaluation of the Dutch guilder by the Euro were more influential. 
In addition to these factors, the authors also conclude that those who voted NO in the 
referendum were largely influenced by concern for the loss of the Dutch language and the 
potential threat to Dutch culture by incoming member states accustomed to lower labor 
standards, with divergent values, and traditions.  
 Data on values and value diversity that are measurable in the context of citizen 
preferences for regional integration are limited and therefore studies such as McLaren, 
Aarts and van der Kolk, and Ruiz-Jiménez and Torreblanca observe the effects through 
exploration of the perception of threat caused by the “other” (individuals with identities, 
religions, languages, traditions, and beliefs different from one‟s own). Where differing 
groups of values exist within the same community, it may lead to a lack of trust in others 
and in turn a degree of skepticism of large groups or government (Putnam 2007). The 
lack of trust between individuals resulting from value diversity is reflected to a degree in 
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the fear for loss of one‟s culture, or feelings of threat caused by other cultures. This 
question of perception of threat is therefore likely motivated by underlying value 
differences. 
 European identity has also emerged within the theme of socio-cultural factors 
which direct individual decision-making. A substantial body of literature accompanies 
this hypothesis suggesting that identity, constructed through feelings of belonging to a 
system with values common to one‟s own breed tendencies to support that system in 
acquiring additional power. Kaelberer (2004) argues that a common currency encourages 
the adoption of a European identity, which in turn reinforces the success of the Euro. The 
author concludes, through a rather simple review of existing literature that membership in 
the Eurozone is a determinant of citizen opinion and he attributes this support for the 
Euro to the adoption of a European identity. Other studies have also confirmed the 
influence of European identity as a factor promoting pro-EU sentiment. According to 
Weβels (2007), when compared to factors such as political interest and education, 
identity is the strongest buffer against EU skepticism. Thus, where European identity is 
high, we should expect that general support for the European Union will also be high. 
 More extensive value and identity based studies have been conducted on the 
European Union in order to determine the degree to which European identity has 
permeated member state mentalities, yet these investigations do little to relate individual 
value differences to variations in support for the EU at the individual level. This link has 
been investigated only in the context of elite preferences. Van der Veen (2005) uses 
frames to outline national elite interests in order to predict the interests that promote 
further integration. The author conducts an analysis of debates on EU enlargement in 
83 
Chapter 4     
lower chambers of parliament in Belgium, Ireland, and the Netherlands from 2000-2002. 
He applies frames to these debates which categorize discourse as typified by cultural 
identity through emphasis on the importance of history, norms, and traditions or qualified 
as a focus on security, geopolitics, and economics. He concludes that the emphasis on the 
economic aspects of integration in the literature is largely unfounded and instead, when 
discussing enlargement elites are far more interested in the role of history, norms and the 
ideals of solidarity with other cultures. 
Risse (2010) also explores the role of identity construction at the level of the 
nation-state to determine the compatibility between national and European values for the 
future of integration. He conducts his analysis using the cases of Germany, Britain and 
France and evaluates the changes in political party discourse beginning with the 1950s 
and ending in the 90s. He concludes that European identity in Britain is highly contrasted 
to national identity. In Germany and France on the other hand, European and national 
identities are becoming increasingly intertwined. 
 Identity, according to Risse (2010) can be both a driver of integration preferences 
and a result of further integration. His findings are limited mainly to political party 
rhetoric and the evaluation of citizen identities as either national or European. The author 
alludes to the deconstruction of identity, acknowledging that there is more to an 
individual‟s self-proclaimed identity than simple association with the national or the 
supranational polity. The elements underlying Europeanness include liberal values, 
Christianity, association with a shared heritage, and mutual traditions. He posits that 
those who do not share in these values but instead associate with a national identity will 
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likely oppose future integration based on the desire to preserve purely national heritage 
and traditions. 
 He does not seek to measure these elements that make up the citizen‟s identity or 
to qualify them any further. Although in both these works Risse attempts to associate 
values with identity and subsequently identity with support for integration, he ignores the 
direct link between individual values and integration at the citizen level. European values 
are now defined by the ToL,
 22
 yet, according to Arts and Halman (2003), cultural 
differences between Europeans are diverse involving a confluence of varying values 
(Arts et al. 2003). It may thus be misleading to depend on a variable such as European 
identity to determine support for the EU as different individuals may define European 
identity differently. In Appendix A I present a table, exposing the values that are 
associated with a strong European identity. According to this analysis, European identity 
is likely found among individuals with low religiosity, high confidence in institutions, 
little fear of the EU, and favorability toward immigrants. I nonetheless include these 
values and an identity variable in my analysis in order to isolate if any of these values 
may be independently driving support or if identity remains the most important 
explanatory factor. 
Bovenberg (2003) suggests that a degree of commonality in values is necessary 
for cooperation and the pursuit of a common goal, such as greater integration of the EU. 
These values include patience and trust, respect for the rule of law, property rights, and 
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 Values of the European Union are incorporated into the text of the treaties in several ways. The following 
passage “drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which 
have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, 
democracy, equality and the rule of law” is added to the preamble of the two treaties. (Official Journal of 
the European Union 2007).  
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the rights of minorities (values similar to those outlined in the ToL as common to all 
Europeans). It is therefore plausible that citizen discontent with the ToL arises not only 
because of economic factors but due to a divergence in values among citizens within the 
Union. While European identity and perception of cultural threat may help understand 
this effect, the investigation of individual values takes the analysis a step further than 
existing studies. Therefore much would be gained by combining an in depth investigation 
into European value variations (not simply European identity) at the citizen level, with an 
analysis of support for European widening and deepening, with further attention to 
variations within deepening (such as support for the Euro, domestic policy convergence, 
and foreign policy involvement). For the purpose of this project and due to data 
limitations on value questions, I evaluate values in more detail on enlargement only as I 
have also demonstrated that this is the form of integration where opposition is highest. 
 The most significant of Gabel‟s conclusions (1998) for the purposes of my 
research and the implications for future integration, is the division of the five theories he 
sets out to test, into two categories. On the one hand, “the cognitive mobilization and 
political values theories posit that a citizen‟s support for integration is based on personal 
political characteristics that are generally immutable throughout adulthood” (Gabel 1998: 
352). These characteristics are classified here as socio-cultural and built upon by adding 
measures of values and identity. On the other hand, utilitarian theory, partisanship, and 
support for government and included in the classification socio-economic factors. 
This analysis, takes into account variations between citizens based on the 
calculations they make when considering integration. These calculations may be 
utilitarian in nature or socio-cultural based on national context. Utilitarian calculations 
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may be predicted based on individual socio-economic status (like education level, 
income, and type of employment) and national context is evaluated through association 
with political parties and government. Calculations based on individual values and 
identity are much more difficult to measure. Studies which explore values do so without 
necessarily naming them as such. Instead they use terms such as culture, identity, and 
values interchangeably. 
Value based calculations in the literature are measured by observing survey 
questions that establish whether there is a fear for the loss of culture, language, or 
traditions. These analyses ignore the variation of values underlying these fears. As 
Lijphart suggests, my analysis will seek to examine in greater detail which values have 
the greatest impact on the sustainability and persistence of European integration. I expect, 
as suggested by Bovenberg, that values such as trust, respect for the rule of law, property 
rights, and the rights of minorities will have the greatest impact on citizen support for 
integration. I also include support for democracy, peace, and solidarity (to name a few) to 
ensure that other values which may be important to integration, are not ignored. The next 
section details the method that will be used, as well as the data that I draw upon. 
 
Method 
I begin with the evaluation of which theories of support for integration drawn from the 
literature have the greatest explanatory power. I outlined the IVs used to test these 
explanations in the data section. In the first analysis (the EB Analysis), I use 
Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European 
Values, and Climate Change, March-May 2008 (European Commission 2011a), as this 
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particular survey has the most variables available across types of integration and theories 
of support. By choosing a dataset with the most relevant variables I am able to conduct 
the analysis at the individual level without losing any important variation that may be 
caused through the aggregation of data to the state level. I conduct multiple OLS 
regressions across the various models on the four dependent variable constructs for 
integration forms, as will also be delineated in the data section below. The findings of 
this analysis provide a hierarchy of factors that influence the different integration 
questions. Using Gabel‟s methodology, I then compare the “substantive significance” of 
the theories (1998: 350). This is explained further using the results from the first 
regression table. 
 In the EVS Analysis section I turn to a more detailed examination of the role of 
values, compared to other socio-cultural and socio-economic factors, on support for 
enlargement. To do so, I use the 2008 European Values Study (EVS 2011) which 
provides more detailed questions on individual citizen value placement. I conduct an 
exploratory factor analysis through which I construct a series of value dimensions. Each 
individual is assigned a score based on how they respond to the questions making up each 
dimension. The construction of these dimensions is explained in the data section. Using a 
regression analysis at the individual level, I compare all explanatory factors and observe 
which have the greatest impact on support for enlargement. Additionally, as with the EB 
analysis, I create a model that contrasts each of the theories of support for integration and 
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Data – Models and Variables 
Models 
As in Chapter 3, length of membership is controlled for to limit the effect of socialization 
of the EU (Hosli and Arnold 2010, McLaren 2002). In the previous chapter, I observe 
that these country groupings are playing a role in the variation of citizen support 
depending on the integration question under investigation. I therefore construct the 
regression outlined above comparing across these national models. These models serve to 
isolate the individual-level factors regardless of the national context. Each individual-
level factor will be observed within the country groupings EU27, EU6, EU9, and EU12. 
Other state-level factors employed in the literature will be used as controls in the models.  
 
Control Variables 
In the first analysis section entitled EB Analysis, I include individual-level characteristics 









modeled after Gabel. I add European identity „European‟. Age is used to control for the 
possible “generational trend” on values, education, and employment type. I also control 
for gender and employment type for the purpose of consistency with Gabel‟s model 
(Gabel 1998: 344). 
State-level controls consist of dummy variables created for each of the 27 member 
states as well as population size („Micro‟, „Small‟, „Medium‟, and „Large‟ States), net EU 
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 „Age‟ is a continuous variable. 
24
 Gender is converted to a dummy variable with the value of 1 for „Female‟. 
25
 Marital status is converted to a dummy variable with the value of 1 for „Married‟. 
26
 Employment controls are „Retired‟, „Student‟, „Farmer‟, and „Homemaker‟. It is not possible to control 
for “small business owner” as done by Gabel and McLaren as this option is no longer available in EB69.2. I 
do, however, use a dummy for entrepreneur under the utilitarian theory group of variables. 
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budget contribution („Net Contributor‟), state placement on the left-right political 
spectrum („Left State‟), welfare state size („Small Welfare State‟ and „Large Welfare 
State‟), and north-south geographical divide („North‟).27  
 In the section analysis section entitled EBS Analysis, I control for the same 
variables.
28
 All of the demographic and socio-economic variables used for this analysis 
are the same as those used in the EB. These variables are used as controls rather than 
explanatory variables in the values analysis due to my interest in determining foremost 
which values play the greatest role in deciding integration preferences and evaluating 





                                                 
27
 Micro State: Population Size  arbitrarily determines this grouping of states based on common divisions of 
states in EU literature  as state with a population less than 1M citizens 
Small State: population between 1M and 30M citizens. 
Medium State: population between 30M and 50M citizens. 
Large State: population greater than 50M citizens.  
Net Contributor: Evaluated as net contributors based on Commission budget calculations of state payments 
to the total budget minus funds received from the EU. The difference between payment and receipt of 
contributions is positive (and dummy coded as 1) where a country pays more to the EU than it receives. 
Left: State classified based on an average expert score less than 5 using CHES 2006 general political 
spectrum question where 0 is extreme left and 10 is extreme right. Data for Cyprus, Luxembourg, and 
Malta are not available. 
Small Welfare State: public social expenditures are less than 20 percent of GDP in 2005 and 2007. This 
specification is not used in the literature; states are referred to as northern or southern without a systematic 
grouping method (OPTEM 2001). 
Large Welfare State: public social expenditures are greater than 25 percent of GDP in 2005 and 2007. Data 
on total social expenditures from OECD are not available for the following countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Romania. 
North: arbitrarily determined as countries with the majority of their territory north of the 47th parallel. 
28
 The EVS does not have a question which allows me to control for Farmer. This likely will have little 
effect on the outcome of the analysis based on the EB findings which demonstrate that the control is 
insignificant across all questions except general EU support (where significance is only observed among 
original member states). 
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According to Gabel‟s predictions that the capitalist nature of the EU will infringe upon 
national welfare policies, I expect as previous studies have demonstrated, that left-leaning 
political supporters will be less supportive of integration. Rather than evaluate the 
individual parties for whom citizens demonstrate support, I examine their self-placement 
on the left right political scale according to the following question: “In political matters 
people talk of “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your views on this scale?” 
I divide this scale into „Left‟, „Center‟, and „Right‟. 
 
Utilitarian Theory 
Individual-level variables that I examine under the utilitarian theory are income and 
education. Income is expected to increase support based on the argument that financial 
capital allows citizens to “exploit the greater investment opportunities provided by more 
open financial markets” (Frieden 1991 in Gabel 1998: 337). Therefore, higher financial 
capital should be accompanied by higher support for integration. There are no questions 
in this Eurobarometer directly related to income therefore I use the following as a proxy: 
“Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: You 
have difficulties paying all your bills at the end of the month.” Rather than coding this 
variable as income I transform it into dummy variables where “Totally Agree” is „Low 
Financial Capital‟ and “Totally Disagree” represents „High Financial Capital‟. The same 
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question does not exist in the EVS; therefore a yearly household income indicator is used. 
This variable is on a scale and is not recoded. Rather the variable is renamed „High 
Financial Capital‟ and can be interpreted in the regression as going from low financial 
capital to high financial capital. 
Education contributes to human capital which “is a strong indicator of a citizen‟s 
ability to adapt to the occupational competition introduced by a liberalized EU labor 
market” (Gabel 1998: 337). Higher education levels should therefore indicate higher 
support for integration. The variable will thus be coded as dummies for „High Education‟, 
where respondents attended school beyond the age of 21. „Low Education‟ reflects 
individuals who stopped their education at 15 years of age or younger. These same 
variables are created in both the EB and EVS analyses. 
Expectations based on employment
29
 status also fall under the assumption of  
human capital (Gabel 1998: 343), wherein the executives
30
 and professionals should 
exhibit higher integration support than manual workers, as will the employed be more 
pro-EU than the unemployed. Gabel categorizes these variables as skilled (Professional) 
and unskilled occupations (Manual Workers and Unemployed). For the purpose of this 
analysis I will use the same categorization. I have added to the EB analysis a variable for 
„Entrepreneur‟, expecting that fear of increased competition created by an open market in 
the EU will lead business owners “Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self-employed 
person” or “Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company” (European 
Commission 2011a) to be less likely to support integration. The question from the 
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 Only „Unemployed‟ is used in the EVS analysis. 
30
 Job category “Executive” is not included in the Eurobarometer used here. 
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Eurobarometer: “What is your current occupation?” provides responses that are divided 
into dummy variables for „Professional‟, „Manual Worker‟, and „Unemployed‟.  
Support for Government 
Gabel evaluates this question based on which political party the respondent supports, if it 
is the party in power they are considered to support the governing party and thus show 
support for government. Without this information, I use the following question regarding 
direct support for the government through evaluation of the respondent‟s trust in the 
national government: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have 
in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to 
trust it or tend not to trust it. The (NATIONALITY) Government” Trust in government is 
dummy coded as 1 and labeled „Support Governing Party‟, the same question is found in 
the EVS. I expect, based on Gabel‟s findings and the results of the Irish post-referendum 




Cognitive Mobilization Theory 
I evaluate cognitive mobilization using the same variable as Gabel: “When you get 
together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, 
occasionally, or never?” Dummies are created for „Never Discuss Politics‟, and 
„Frequently Discuss Politics‟. I expect from Gabel‟s findings that as cognitive 
mobilization increases (through increased frequency of discussion of political issues) that 
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support for integration will also be higher. However, these findings are not constant 
across EU groups as later members show no distinction in support based on this measure. 
Cognitive mobilization theory suggests that mobilization increases through 
increased discussion and awareness of political issues but it also requires a level of 
understanding of these issues. I therefore include an additional question for cognitive 
mobilization in my study: “For each of the following statements about the European 
Union could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false: The EU currently 
consists of fifteen Member States.” One dummy is created for „Low Knowledge‟, where 
the respondent has incorrectly answered the question. The correct answer to this question 
is false, at the time of this study the EU consisted of 27 members. This question reflects 
very basic knowledge of the EU‟s membership and a wrong answer would contribute to 
determination of low cognitive mobilization.  
 
Political Values Theory 
Again, I use the same question as the previous studies to determine materialist or post-
materialist values. This distinction was also used by De Vreese (2004) to determine 
attitudes toward the constitution in Denmark and the Netherlands, an elaboration on 
Gabel and McLaren‟s general support question. The expectation derived from the 
findings of each of these analyses is that post-materialist values should be associated with 
greater EU support. The question used for the measure is: “There is a lot of talk these 
days about what (OUR COUNTRY)‟s goals should be for the next ten or fifteen years. 
On this card are listed some of the goals that different people say should be given top 
priority. Would you please say which one of them you, yourself, consider to be most 
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important in the long run?” Responses are coded as follows depending on the individual‟s 
first choice: “Maintaining order in the country” „Materialist‟, “Giving people more say in 
important Government decisions” „Post-Materialist‟, “Fighting rising prices” 
„Materialist‟, “Protecting freedom of speech” „Post-Materialist‟. 
 
European Identity 
European Identity: The identity variable is added and used in this analysis as an 
explanatory factor of integration support, rather than a resulting factor of greater 
integration. This variable was not used in either Gabel or McLaren‟s studies and thus will 
contribute to the expansion of their analyses. I expect, based on the discussion of 
European identity above, that greater association with Europe will be linked with higher 
integration support. The question that I use is: “Thinking about this, to what extent do 
you personally feel you are…European,” coded as a dummy „European‟ where 
respondent answers feeling European “to a great extent,” while „Not European‟ reflects 
respondents who replied “not at all.” 
 
Values 
EB Values: Due to the lack of previous research examining the role of values in 
determining EU support, I do not limit the values observed except through the data that 
are available. The purpose is to ensure that my analysis accounts for any possible 
variation that may be offered by values. The main values that are expected to positively 
influence integration as outlined by Bovenberg (2003) are patience and trust, respect for 
the rule of law, property rights, and the rights of minorities. Not all of these values are 
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available through the Eurobarometer under investigation, nor are they available in any 
other Eurobarometer conducted during the time period of this study. 
I therefore examine values in the EB analysis from the following question: “And 
in the following list, which are three most important values for you personally? „The Rule 
of Law‟, „Respect for Human Life‟, „Human Rights‟, „Individual Freedom‟, 
„Democracy‟, „Peace‟, „Equality‟, „Solidarity‟, „Tolerance‟, „Religion‟, „Self-
Fulfillment‟, „Respect for Other Cultures‟.” Although most can be considered largely 
liberal values, observing the relationship between these variables and support for 
integration allows me to establish, at least preliminarily, which values
31
 are more 
important for increased support for integration. I expect, based on Bovenberg‟s 
predictions, that higher support should be observed where respondents have selected Rule 
of Law, Individual Freedom, and Respect for Other Cultures. 
EVS Values: The European Values Study provides a much more diverse range of 
values from which to select explanatory variables and the challenge here, rather than 
finding questions that properly evaluate underlying socio-cultural tendencies, is instead to 
determine which factors should be excluded. I have therefore, as Hagenaars, Halman, and 
Moors (2003) have done, created a series of value dimensions through principal 
component analysis (PCA) of the 300 EVS value questions. This form of analysis allows 
me to reduce the plethora of variables into to manageable categories, grouping indicators 
which are correlated with each other while ensuring that factors are not correlated across 
categories. Predictions can then be made based on these value categories, called factors. 
                                                 
31
 An exploratory factor analysis of these variables revealed that eigenvalues, “reflecting the amount of 
variation in all the original variables” by any one component, were lower than 1 in all cases and therefore 
principal components could not be retained in this analysis for the creation of variable dimensions (See 
(Arts et al. 2003, 26). 
96 
Chapter 4     
The results of this analysis produce 40 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, 
therefore, to determine which categories should be conserved; I produce a scree plot of 
the eigenvalues and observe the “point on the line connecting the plotted eigenvalues 
where the slope of the line changes from large to small” ( Hagenaars et al. 2003).32 Based 
on this technique, nine factors would be retained. Doing this combines many questions 
within a single component which seem logically unrelated to each other. I have, 
therefore, opted to use the Kaiser method (selecting factors based on their eigenvalues of 
more than 1) and further reduce the factors that also have a Cronbach‟s alpha of greater 
than 0.6. “Cronbach‟s alpha is a measure of internal consistency, that is, how closely 
related a set of items are as a group” (UCLA 2012). It is a measure of reliability and is 
used to determine whether the constructed measure created from the combination of 
variables that make up each factor dimension, correctly captures the variance of the 
composing indicators. I limit the analysis thus to 23 factors which can be further divided 
into eight categories. A grouping of questions included in each of these factors is 
displayed in Appendix C. The categories are the following: Religious Values, 
Orientations toward Institution, Orientations toward Work, Tolerance, Moral and Ethical 
Values, Family Values, Political Values, Postmodern Values. 
To build on prior authors‟ findings that perceived threat of EU construction 
promotes anti-EU sentiment, I also include a measure for EU fear, the questions making 
up this measure are “fear for loss of social security,” “national identity/culture,” “state 
loss of power,” “loss of jobs,” or that “the country pays more” (EVS 2011). 
 
                                                 
32
 Displayed in Appendix B 
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Based on the integration questions outlined in Chapter 3 and the availability of 
corresponding questions in a single Eurobarometer survey, I create four multidimensional 
measures for types of integration for the EB individual-level analyses and one outcome 
variable for the EVS analysis. 
The first „Widening‟ represents a measure for overall citizen support for EU 
enlargement. In the EB analysis it combines the responses to dichotomous variables 
„Macedonia‟, „Croatia‟, „Turkey‟, and „Enlargement‟. By combining these variables into 
a single measure, therefore, I produce a categorical variable with a broader range in 
variation.  Possible scores on this scale range from 0 to 4 where I assume that an 
individual who scores 0 is against all enlargements, while a 4 would demonstrate pro-
enlargement feelings, regardless of the candidate state in question. 
In the EVS Analysis, there is only one integration question available for analysis. 
This measure examines individuals‟ (EVS 2011) attitudes toward enlargement using the 
question: “Some say that the European Union enlargement should go further. Others say 
it has already gone too far. Using this card, which number best describes your position, 
where „1‟ means “should go further,” and „10‟ means “has already gone too far?” (EVS 
2011) The benefit of this question is the range on which respondents may provide an 
answer. Through OLS regression with this variable, here also given the name 
„Widening‟, I can evaluate the incremental effect of socio-economic and socio-cultural 
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factors on this form of integration. Thus the scale resembles the categorical scale created 
for the EB evaluation that combines several different enlargement variables into one. 
„Institutions‟ is created from responses to the dichotomous variables „Parliament‟, 
„Council‟, and „Commission‟. Positive responses to each of these questions have the 
value of 1. As with the widening measure, I create a categorical variable. The measure 
establishes trust in EU institutions with responses ranging from 0 to 3. A value of 0 
signifies that an individual does not trust any of these institutions, while 3 indicates trust 
in all three. 
„Deepening‟ combines responses to the two variables used in the Treaty measure 
(support for a foreign minister was not available in this dataset): „Defense‟ and „Foreign‟. 
The score ranges from 0 to 2, where 0 is no support for deepening and 2 is the highest 
support. 
Finally, „General‟ measures the degree of citizen support for the EU in general 
across the various measures used by the literature. These measures include „Benefit‟, 
„Good‟, „Direction‟, and „Image‟. Individuals who demonstrate the highest level of 
support for the EU in general will score 4 points on this constructed variable, while no 
support for the Union in general will be reflected by a score of 0. 
 
Analysis 
EB Analysis – Testing Theories of Support for EU Integration 
Table 4.1 displays the OLS regression analysis of the six possible explanations for the 
degree of citizen discontent on the question of general EU widening. The control 
variables I use in this analysis are contained in a separate table in Appendix D and as they 
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are important here only to ensure that they are not confounding the predictions of my 
theories, I leave interpretation of their effects out of the discussion. Additionally 
regression analyses for the remaining three dependent variables (the EU in General, 
Institutions, and Deepening) are included in Appendices E to G. For interpretation of the 
regression results I refer mainly to the question of increased widening while drawing 
parallels with the findings of these analyses to support conclusions about the role of each 
factor on integration support. 
In Figure 4.1, I display the factors influencing support for integration across 
integration questions. The discussion of the regression results proceeds by pointing out 
the general findings within each theory across state groups. The numbers reported are 
beta coefficients that have been standardized. Standardizing these coefficients allows me 
to compare the size of influence of each explanatory variable on the outcome variable.  
This means that instead of reporting coefficients as one unit change in the IV and the 
resulting change in the DV while holding all other IVs constant, I measure the variation 
in standard deviations. In other words, the coefficients mean little in terms of units but 
provide evidence of the size of the effect of the IVs on the DV and the direction of this 
effect, while also allowing for a comparison across IVs. This allows me to construct a 
hierarchy among explanatory factors. I draw only on coefficients for IVs that emerge as 
statistically significant in the models. I only report variables where I am 95 percent 
confident that a link between variables exists, these instances are denoted by at least one 
asterisk (*): they are based on p-values of 0.05(*) for 95 percent confidence, 0.01(**) for 
99 percent confidence, and 0.001(***) for 99.9 percent confidence.
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EU27 EU6 EU9 EU12
Socio-Economic Explanations
Party Affiliation
Left  0.0968***  0.252***  0.114** -0.0627
Right -0.0847*** -0.0746 -0.179*** -0.00969
Utilitarian Theory
Low Financial Capital -0.156*** -0.0199 -0.253*** -0.155***
High Financial Capital  0.0721**  0.0789  0.0886*  0.0688
High Education  0.138***  0.183***  0.116*  0.133**
Low Education -0.116*** -0.0907 -0.121** -0.110*
Professional -0.0133  0.0444  0.159 -0.132
Manual Worker -0.0411 -0.0463 -0.0958 -0.00678
Unemployed  0.0355 -0.192* -0.0108  0.179*
Entrepreneur -0.0587 -0.0923 -0.148  0.0347
Support for Government
Support Governing Party  0.309***  0.327***  0.325***  0.251***
Socio-Cultural Explanations
Cognitive Mobilization Theory
Never Discuss Politics -0.156*** -0.0607 -0.251*** -0.0857*
Frequently Discuss Politics -0.00489  0.148** -0.0329 -0.0903*
Low Knowledge  0.163*** 0.108* 0.137*** 0.229***
Political Values Theory
Materialist -0.130*** -0.270*** -0.112*  0.119
Post Materialist  0.112*** -0.0153  0.220***  0.0657*
Values
The Rule of Law  0.0497  0.0571  0.000673  0.0974*
Respect for Human Life  0.130***  0.172***  0.173***  0.0562
Human Rights  0.201***  0.215***  0.206***  0.183***
Individual Freedom  0.0969***  0.106  0.0456  0.142**
Democracy  0.142***  0.136**  0.121**  0.152**
Peace  0.101***  0.113*  0.0404  0.131**
Equality  0.153***  0.230***  0.102*  0.151**
Solidarity  0.237***  0.379***  0.192***  0.139*
Tolerance  0.178***  0.270***  0.223***  0.0864
Religion  0.0277  0.285** -0.0356 -0.0165
Self Fulfilment  0.0573  0.171*  0.0567  0.0323
Respect for Other Cultures  0.366***  0.461***  0.380***  0.259***
Identity
European  0.334***  0.513***  0.254***  0.261***
Not European -0.525*** -0.474*** -0.615*** -0.431***
N 21,374 5,315 7,766 7,427
Adj. R
2
0.162 0.153 0.17 0.081
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
EB Analysis - ExplainingCitizen Discontent with EU Widening Across Member 
States
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate 
Change, March-May 2008 
Table 4.1 – EB Analysis – Explaining Citizen Discontent with EU Widening 
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To begin, I observe the validity of socio-economic theories. The first category of 
explanatory factors reveals that the left-right political spectrum argument which states 
that affiliation with left leaning parties is likely to produce less support for integration 
seems to be negated here in the context of the enlargement question only. Party affiliation 
seems only to positively affect pro-EU enlargement sentiment in EU6 and EU9 member 
groupings. More liberal individuals within those states are more pro-enlargement, likely 
due to their tendency to support liberal values of equality and the promotion of equality 
and individual rights. For this reason, left-wing citizens encourage the enlargement of the 
union to include member states that will be later bound by the EU‟s values to promote 
those ideals within new states. 
On all other questions, deepening, the EU in General, and support for EU 
institutions, the expected relationship between party affiliation and pro-EU sentiment is 
observed. I anticipated that left-leaning individuals would be less pro-EU. This 
relationship, although significant, is very small compared to other factors. On the EU in 
general and support for institutions, left-wing placement is important in later members. 
The literature explains this phenomenon based on the capitalist nature of EU policies and 
the threat this poses to individuals who support a strong welfare state. 
The utilitarian theory in this model plays an important role in determining support 
across EU27, and generally across all other EU groupings. The factor that effects support 
most across groups under the utilitarian theory is education. While financial capital is 
important, it is less so in original EU6 member states. On the question of increased 
deepening, education drives the utilitarian calculations in the original six. 
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Support for the governing party demonstrates a clear positive influence on 
integration, regardless of the integration question and consistent across all integration 
groups. As seen in Chapter 2, national governments are clearly pro-integrationist, 
regardless of the member state and like-mindedness runs very high across political parties 
as well. Therefore, any support for the governing party should automatically entail 
support for their policies, which are clearly pro-integration. 
Consistent with previous studies, low cognitive mobilization decreases EU 
support in all groupings except EU12. Only among EU12 on the question of enlargement, 
does mobilization not predict support based on negative influence of both high and low 
mobilization variables.  Both coefficients for frequent and infrequent discussion of 
political issues show a significant effect on enlargement yet the coefficient is very small, 
and in comparison to other factors has little influence. Knowledge of the EU in this case 
is a more reliable indicator of the link between cognitive mobilization and support for the 
EU, where frequency of discussion requires low knowledge of the EU in order to entail 
increased support for enlargement.  
This is contradictory to findings of the Flash Eurobarometer in the Netherlands 
and Ireland following referenda that report that higher knowledge of EU issues should 
instead inspire greater support. The explanation of this discrepancy may be the 
measurement used for knowledge where the Flash EB asks individuals about their 
knowledge level yet this study uses a measure that is not affected by subjectivity of 
respondents‟ self-evaluation of their own knowledge. 
 Political values theory predicts less support for integration among individuals 
with materialists inclination. This is generally the case for the EU as a whole and state 
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level controls do not influence this finding. My results are consistent with Eichenberg and 
Dalton (2007) and support the claim that individuals concerned with materialist values 
such as fighting rising prices and maintaining order will be increasingly fearful of the 
effect of an enlarged union on the quality of the national welfare state and maintaining 
the benefits it currently offers. 
European identity is positively correlated with higher support on all forms of 
integration. The coefficients for „European‟ and „Not European‟ are both significant 
across all models and are higher than all other coefficients. This finding is consistent with 
the studies previously reported confirming that identity is an important driving force of 
integration support. 
 On values there is more variation. Respect for other cultures is positively linked to 
integration across all country groups. Mostly, the other values are positively linked with 
integration across all groups and questions as well. In fact, none of the values are 
negatively correlated with integration preference. There are few discernable patterns that 
emerge and without more extensive value questions, the conclusions of this analysis on 
values are evocative at best. Those who value respect for human life, peace and self-
fulfillment support general EU integration, and individuals displaying concern for the 
rule of law, respect for human life, peace and respect for other cultures are more likely to 
support more decision-making by EU institutions. This tendency supports the decision of 
EU leaders to incorporate these same values within the text of the newly adopted ToL, 
arguing that such values are the foundation on which the EU was built (Official Journal 
of the European Union 2007). I turn now to the evaluation of the substantive value of 
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each of the support for integration theories across integration questions and, in the EVS 
Analysis, further qualification of the role of values on support for enlargement. 
 Figure 4.1 illustrates the comparison of the explanatory power of each of the six 
theories of support on each integration question category. For the purpose of 
simplification, I do not compare these theories across country groupings but instead 
across forms of integration. Any state-specific variation is controlled for using the state-
level control dummies and dummies for all other state-level factors. Using a technique 
similar to that of Gabel, I construct a measure for the explanatory power of each theory 
based on the maximum amount of variation explained by the variables included in that 
theory. I calculate the distance between significant coefficient values for variables in each 
theory group which are expected to demonstrate opposite effects on the dependent 
variable. This calculation enables me to compare the size of the effect of each theory on 
support for integration. For instance, on support for the EU in general, the size of 
explanatory power of the Cognitive Mobilization theory is measured by calculating the 
distance between the coefficients of “Never Discuss Politics” and “Frequently Discuss 
Politics” (0.0678+0.150=0.2178), where individuals who report greater rates of cognitive 
mobilization demonstrate 0.2178 points higher support for the EU in general. On 
indicators that are expected to demonstrate opposing effects on the dependent variable yet 
both have the same effect, the theory is assumed to have no “substantive significance.” 
To remain consistent with Gabel‟s study, I exclude the coefficient for Low 
Knowledge from this calculation. On the dimension representing the Utilitarian theory 
explanation, there are four categories of variables, income, education, skilled occupation, 
and unskilled occupation. I calculate the difference between the dummy variables, where 
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applicable, and average the explanation provided by each category across the utilitarian 
theory.
33
 For variables measuring the same tendency within the same category, such as 
Manual Worker and Unemployed, I take the average coefficient value.
34
 Where 
coefficients are not significant, they are excluded.
                                                 
33
 On the EU in general, Low Financial Capital (0.249) + High Financial Capital (0.191) = 0.44, Low 
Education (0.159) + High Education (0.191) = 0.35. The average explanatory power of the utilitarian theory 
is therefore 0.3075.On the skilled- unskilled occupations counterpart variables, the coefficients are not 
significant and are therefore excluded. 
34
 On the EU in general, the average for unskilled occupation would be (0.114+0.0853)/2)=0.09965 
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Comparing the Explanatory Power of Integration Support Theories 
Explaining Citizen Support across Integration Questions 
Cognitive Mobilization Theory Political Values Theory Party Affiliation Utilitarian Theory
Support for Government Values Identity
*Change may be positive or negative 
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, 
March-May 2008  
Figure 4.1 – EB Analysis - Explanatory Power of Integration Support Theories 
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As observed in the evaluation of regression results, identity plays the greatest role in 
determining support for integration across questions. On institutions and the EU in 
general, support for government is also a very strong predictor. This is likely due, as 
mentioned, to the high degree of clear like-mindedness across political elites wherein 
support for government can easily be taken hand in hand with support for the EU. On 
institutions, this may be reflective of an overarching tendency to have confidence in 
government and institutions in general. 
In the case of cognitive mobilization it seems to stand up as a theory in the 
context of trust in institutions, suggesting greater political awareness leads to a greater 
likelihood to trust the EU and its governing bodies. The most common utilitarian theory 
visibly falls out as the leading factor in determining integration support here with liberal 
values, political values and party affiliation not trailing far behind. I suspect, due to the 
limitations of the EB data, that the types of values included in this analysis (i.e. largely 
liberal values) ignore much of the potential variation that is dominated by cultural 
differences between individuals (such as the diversity of values underlying European 
identity as reflected in Appendix A). I turn therefore to the EVS analysis which provides 
a more in-depth investigation of the role of value dimensions on enlargement, the form of 
integration with the greatest citizen opposition across member states. 
 
EVS Analysis – Adding Value 
Prior to drawing conclusions across datasets, it is necessary to compare whether the two 
different data sets are analogous. Figure 4.2 provides the comparison of the predictive 
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power of the theories in each dataset (as calculated in Figure 4.1), excluding value 
dimensions; the corresponding regression table can be found in Appendix H.
35
 
Figure 4.2 – Comparing the Datasets – EVS Analysis vs. EB Analysis 
 
 
According to this illustration, in both datasets, European identity still stands out as the 
strongest predictor of preferences for enlargement. In the EVS analysis, party affiliation 
is the second highest predictor as opposed to cognitive mobilization. However, this may 
be due to the party-affiliation question capturing more of the variation which would 
otherwise be attributed to the political values theory.
36
 The EB reflects this finding with a 
coefficient for protection of freedom of speech higher than any of the other 
materialist/post-materialist indicators and with the same positive effect. 
On the direction of the effects of each of these measures, the two datasets reveal 
almost identical results for all indicators including demographic factors such as age and 
country of residence. This is the case for all countries except Lithuania, which can be 
                                                 
35
 In this comparison analysis I exclude factors which are unique to a particular dataset. 
36
 When run without the left-right indicator, the EVS study reveals that the post-materialist measure under 



















Comparing Analyses  
On the Predictive Power of Theories of Support for EU Widening 
Sources: 
European Values Study 2008 
Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March -May 2008  
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explained by the enlargement question being used in the two analyses. In the case of 
Lithuania, citizens are anti-enlargement in general yet demonstrate significantly pro-
enlargement tendencies on the widening measure, which includes attitudes toward 
inclusion of Turkey, Macedonia, and Croatia. This indicates that citizens in this country 
although they may be in favor of enlargement to include one of these countries, they are 
skeptical to accept enlargement in general (reflected by a positive correlation between all 
individual enlargement indicators but a negative response to enlargement in general). 
This Figure, along with a statistical test of variance on the same indicators, reveals that 
both datasets are representative
37
 of the same population and variance is similar across all 
EU27 countries. 
 My investigation turns to the EVS dataset for investigation of the underlying role 
of values in determining support for further integration. Analysis on the types of values 
present in the European member states exist and are rather extensive. These value-based 
investigations do not relate differences to degrees of support for EU integration. 
Determining differences based on value variations across the EU contribute substantially 
to the understanding of preferences. In Table 4.2 and 4.3, I present the results of the 
regression analysis for all explanatory factors on enlargement preferences using the EVS 
dataset. The data presented are from the same regression but are split into two tables by 
socio-economic versus socio-cultural theories to improve readability. Control variables 
are placed in Appendix I. Coefficients are standardized as in the previous analyses and 
                                                 
37
 A variance ratio test (F test) of the two datasets comparing the means, standard deviations and standard 
errors also reveals with 99 percent confidence that the variance of the two samples on the enlargement 
question are equal. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, based on similar wording of the enlargement 
question, similar findings on the predictions of each independent variable, and a confident rejection of the 
null that the two samples have unequal variance is sufficient to demonstrate that the samples and 
integration question are comparable. 
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are interpreted in the same way. I have specified models as in Table 4.1 for EU 
enlargement groups. 
Table 4.2 – EVS Analysis – Socio-Economic Explanation for Citizen Discontent 
 
 
EU27 EU6 EU9 EU12
Socio-Economic Explanations
Party Affiliation
Left  0.189**  0.304*  0.168 -0.0315
Right -0.121 -0.0674 -0.351*  0.000291
Utilitarian Theory
High Financial Capital -0.0307* -0.0399  0.0138 -0.0624*
High Education -0.0802  0.119 -0.380**  0.00294
Low Education  0.0138 -0.136  0.125  0.029
Unemployed -0.18 -0.213  0.0484 -0.277
Support for Government
Support Governing Party  0.218***  0.0469  0.220**  0.325***
N 11,169 3,070 3,105 4,994
Adj. R
2
 0.211  0.2  0.223  0.176
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: European Values Study 2008
EVS Analysis - Socio-Economic Explanation for Citizen Discontent with EU Widening Across Member States
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)
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Table 4.3 – EVS Analysis – Socio-Cultural Explanation for Citizen Discontent 
 
EU27 EU6 EU9 EU12
Socio-Cultural Explanations
Cognitive Mobilization Theory
Never Discuss Politics -0.00121  0.155 0.197 -0.206*
Frequently Discuss Politics -0.0359 -0.106 0.105 -0.111
Political Values Theory
Materialist -0.203 -0.338 -0.275 -0.00544
Post Materialist -0.0506 -0.259 -0.0263  0.0667
EU Fears
Fear about building the EU (not afraid)  0.229***  0.266***  0.242***  0.193***
Religious values
1. Outlooks toward religion (not important)  0.00517  0.027 -0.105  0.0794
2. Orientations toward religious ceremonies (not important)  0.0488 -0.216  0.0848  0.103
3. Orientations toward afterlife (do not believe) -0.0629  0.114  0.0997 -0.221*
Orientation toward Institutions
4. Orientations toward institutions (not confident) -0.0421 -0.357* -0.0872 0.108
5. Orientations toward government organizations (not confident) -0.291*** -0.294*** -0.343*** -0.229***
Orientations toward work
7. Orientations toward work (not important) -0.0756* -0.0172 -0.0239 -0.188**
8. Workplace motivations (not important) -0.329***  0.00647 -0.506** -0.285*
Tolerance Values
9. Orientations toward immigrants (accepting)  0.273***  0.318***  0.313***  0.211***
10. Orientations toward marginalized groups (unconcerned)  0.0281 -0.0334 -0.056  0.136*
11. Orientations toward neighbors (unconcerned) -0.0699 -0.164*  0.0131 -0.0807
Moral and Ethical Values
12. Civil Permissiveness (permissive) -0.0675**  0.0235  0.0197 -0.165***
13. Moral Permissiveness (permissive)  0.0191 -0.0392  0.112** -0.0046
14. Orientations toward abortion (non-permissive) -0.00593 -0.0255 -0.102  0.0757
Family Values
15. Orientations children (not important) -0.157** -0.00765 -0.293** -0.148
16. Sociocultural orientations toward marriage (heterogeneity)  0.133*  0.255* -0.0118  0.143
17. Interpersonal orientations toward marriage(non-reciprocal)  0.0406  0.0453  0.0525  0.022
18.  Orientations toward gender roles (inequality) -0.0377 -0.181  0.209 -0.06
19.  Orientations toward women and work (women should work)  0.0596 -0.0385  0.155*  0.0689
Political Values
20. Orientations toward civil activism (never) -0.0289 -0.151  0.220* -0.0733
21. Orientations toward Democracy (democracy works)  0.104**  0.0283  0.0568  0.162***
22. Orientations toward politics (not important) -0.0483  0.0233 -0.148* -0.0132
Postmodern Values
23. Orientations toward leisure (not important) -0.0773 -0.0999 -0.128 -0.0637
Identity
European  0.452***  0.278  0.946***  0.0855
N 11,169 3,070 3,105 4,994
Adj. R
2
 0.211  0.2  0.223  0.176
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: European Values Study 2008
EVS Analysis - Socio-Cultural Explanation for Citizen Discontent with EU Widening Across Member States
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)
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Through the incorporation of values in the analysis, I find that certain differences can be 
observed when compared to the EB analysis. Factors that were previously important in 
determining support for the EU are no longer significant. On party affiliation, the 
previous analysis revealed that left-wing citizens are more supportive of enlargement; 
this finding is confirmed here in original EU6 and EU9 countries. 
 Where education drove the utilitarian calculation for support of enlargement in 
EU6 states the power of the utilitarian theory is diminished in these groups by value 
effects. Utilitarian theory calculations based on financial capital remain important in 
EU12 members and on human capital in EU9. The clear effect of support for government 
theory is further corroborated by the EVS analysis, regardless of the addition of other 
explanatory factors. In EU6 only the support for government explanation falls out, it is 
replaced in these cases with values of confidence in institutions and acceptance of 
immigrants. 
 Cognitive mobilization was an important driving force, where individuals who 
discussed politics often were more likely to be aware of political integration in the EU 
and would therefore be more supportive of it. Previous research was confirmed by the EB 
analysis wherein greater cognitive mobilization had a positive effect on views of 
enlargement. Although this remains the case according to the EVS analysis, it is only a 
significant relationship in EU12 countries. Accordingly, citizens who never discuss 
politics are less likely to favor enlargement. In all other country groups other factors 
influence integration preferences. 
 Political values had proven to be largely insignificant compared to other 
indicators in the previous analysis which is also consistent with previous research. 
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Depending on the model, it was found that this factor either fell out completely or was 
among the least powerful explanations of EU support. According to the EVS analysis, I 
can further confirm that, on enlargement, citizens‟ materialist or post-materialist values 
are insignificant in predicting their attitudes toward the inclusion of additional member 
states in the EU. 
Across all models there is a significant effect of fear about the building of the EU 
and this remains strong regardless of controlling for underlying values. Prior work had 
suggested this phenomenon and the findings of this analysis can confidently uphold these 
conclusions. While this fear is important, the values that underlie decision-making in 
every model remain significantly more powerful. Although it remains strong in a few of 
the models, only certain countries consider European identity more so than other factors 
such as those values that underlie this identity. In the cases of EU9, European identity is 
stronger than perceived threat caused by integration. In other country groupings, 
orientations toward government and institutions, orientations toward immigrants and 
values regarding the importance of work are significantly more powerful in driving these 
attitudes than both identity and the perception of threat. 
Values have thus taken over much of the influence of other factors in this analysis 
where materialist and post-materialist considerations are likely replaced with orientations 
toward government and institutions, left-right political placement by orientations toward 
immigration and civil activism, and cognitive mobilization by orientations toward 
democracy and politics. 
 This analysis reveals that, in all cases, European identity, values of orientation 
toward institutions, or orientations toward immigration have the greatest effect on public 
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opinion toward European enlargement. For a clearer view of the power of each of these 
explanations, the next section compares all integration support theories based on the 
power of each of the indicators that make up those theories. 
 
A Hierarchical Model of Support for Integration across Member States 
Figure 4.3 provides a ranking of integration support theories similar to the model created 
in the EB analysis after Gabel demonstrating substantive significance. Although there are 
variations based on the specification of different models, interpretation of variation at the 
level of EU27 allows for further clarification of the conclusions drawn from the various 
EU studies from which this analysis was designed.
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The Explanatory Power of Integration Support Theories - EU27 
Source: European Values Study 2008 
Figure 4.3 – EVS Analysis - Integration Support Theories in EU27 
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I can observe from Figure 4.3 that, as posited by McLaren (2002), there is more to citizen 
opinion in the EU than the utilitarian calculations commonly proposed in the literature. 
Although she rejected utilitarian concerns in favor of the influence of perceived cultural 
threat, I find on the contrary that European identity on its own is the driving force behind 
support for enlargement. This result further corroborates the findings displayed in Figure 
4.1 of this chapter using different data and controlling for more factors. 
In the previous analysis, when controlling for liberal values such as those 
entrenched in the ToL, support for government stands out as the second most influential 
factor to identity. In the current analysis, more diverse values are examined to capture 
both liberal and conservative orientations, inclinations toward marginalized groups and 
diverse areas such as moral and ethical tolerance and orientations toward work and 
family. I find when observing the aggregate of EU27 member states, that support for 
government loses much of its predictive power, replaced instead by values of tolerance 
and orientations toward institutions. Comparing the explanatory power of integration 
support theories at the aggregate level, although it offers a „big picture‟ view of what may 
be most important in driving public preferences, it ignores the fluctuations across state 
groupings. Figure 4.4 illustrates the differences that can be observed between these 
groups.
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Figure 4.4 – EVS Analysis - Integration Support Theories in EU6, EU9, and EU12 
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At the level of EU enlargement groups I find somewhat different results than at the 
aggregate level. Where European identity seems to be the most important driving factor 
of citizen preferences for EU27, Figure 4.4 reveals instead that identity is important only 
in EU9 countries. Due to recent membership of EU12 countries it is likely that citizens 
have yet to adopt a strong European identity and therefore attitudes to EU building are 
based on some other factor. In this grouping I find that support for government explains 
the most variation in public opinion on enlargement within the newest wave of widening. 
Accession to the EU is the most recent and visible form of integration that has occurred 
in these member states. In several cases, at the time of the survey used here, the 
governments that signed and ratified accession treaties are still in power. The strength of 
this factor therefore suggests that individuals that are satisfied with decisions made on 
their behalf by national governments are more likely to support ongoing decisions made 
by them. 
In both EU9 and EU12 groupings although each exhibit at least ten significant 
explanations for attitudes toward enlargement, orientations toward work are the second 
most important determinant. To understand the reason for this tendency it is necessary to 
look at the variables that underlie the orientations toward work value dimension and the 
direction of its influence of EU support. According to this dimension, questions capture 
the factors that motivate individuals to be fulfilled by their work. According to the 
regression in Table 4.3, the less likely respondents are to seek out things that will 
improve their work life, the less supportive of EU building they are. This can be stated in 
reverse as well: the greater individual tendency to seek out fulfillment in work, the more 
pro-integration they will be. Those people are likely to see the EU as an opportunity to 
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achieve such fulfillment by benefitting from the increased standardization of labor and 
subsequently improved working conditions, as well as increased job opportunities 
resulting from freedom of labor movement in the Union. 
EU6 member states reveal less diverse explanations for enlargement preferences. 
The driving factor is orientations toward institutions. Through reference again to the 
regression table and description of value dimensions, I can conclude that the link between 
orientations toward institutions and support for enlargement are influenced by overall 
confidence in governmental organizations, not limited only to the EU but including the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) as well. This 
result would suggest that individuals in earlier member states have become accustomed to 
the institutionalization of supranational organizations in the nation state. Long term 
exposure to the effects of membership in such organizations should thus provide citizens 
with clear feelings on the ability their organizational effectiveness. This is measured 
through confidence in the organization, where increased confidence gives way to 
willingness to allow national powers to the supranational level through increased 
integration. 
Finally in the EU6, party affiliation figures as second to trust in institutions. The 
result on this measure is driven by respondents who report a left-leaning ideology. This 
finding is corroborated by a consistently high result for the factor of fear of other 
cultures. Strong left-leaning ideology is associated with higher support for enlargement 
based on the underlying value of support for equal rights and inclusiveness of others 
commonly associated with leftist ideals. A lack of such a tendency toward inclusiveness 
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In this chapter, I set out to answer the final research question of this thesis: What explains 
the degree of citizens‟ discontent? I conclude based on the findings of the analyses 
contained herein that there is far more to the integration question than the mainly socio-
economic calculations traditionally used in EU literature. In an enlarged Union with 
varying cultures and individual values, common identity plays the greatest role in uniting 
citizens on all integration questions. The values underlying this identity may also be 
dividing the EU on the question of further enlargement. 
I find that even when controlling for factors drawn from common support for 
integration theories, the main factors driving opposition to enlargement in the EU at the 
aggregate level are identity, fears of perceived threat to national culture, lack of trust in 
institutions and low tolerance of others. These values are potentially detrimental to the 
future of EU construction, at least insofar as the addition of new member states. On 
identity, I can conclude with confidence that it plays a leading role in deciding pro or 
anti-EU orientations, regardless of the question. Without additional data on values for 
other integration questions, I cannot make any conclusive assumptions on their role in 
promoting institutional deepening or the EU in general. I can conclude based on the 
similarities I establish between the predictive powers of factors between the EB and EVS 
datasets, that values likely play a key role in influencing public opinion on all forms of 
integration. 
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This tendency for identity to influence opinion on the other hand is determined 
mainly by member states in the EU9. In the original six members, confidence in 
government organizations in general outside of just the EU, explains the greatest 
variation in support for enlargement. In the most recent enlargement group, support for 
national government is the greatest motivating factor for enlargement support. Factors 
that are important at the aggregate level such as tolerance values remain significant but 
are less important than other factors in the models resulting from the time at which states 
joined the EU. 
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CHAPTER 5 –IS DISCONTENT A GENERAL PHENOMENON? 
Response to the general question of this thesis is divided into four research questions, the 
answers to which I display in Table 5.1 and discuss below: 
Table 5.1 – Research Findings 
Research Question Findings 
(RQ1) What is the degree of 
permissive consensus in the 
EU? 
General EU citizen support is declining (since the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993), 
indicating the end of permissive consensus. 
(RQ2) Is discontent with the 
ToL a general phenomenon 
across all member states? 
Discontent with the ToL is present in Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, and the UK but is not a general 
phenomenon across all member states (why discontent 
is higher in these countries remains unclear). 
 
(RQ3) What is the nature of 
citizen discontent? 
While citizens are voting against deepening from 2006-
2009, discontent is actually highest on the question of 
EU widening (enlargement). 
(RQ4) What explains citizen 
discontent? 
My findings are divided by enlargement group as 
follows, listing only the most important integration 
support theory observed in each group. 
EU27: European identity 
EU6: Trust in intergovernmental organizations 
EU9: European identity 
EU12: Support for national government 
 
Findings 
According to previous studies on permissive consensus, elites have successfully pushed 
integration forward in the EU thanks to a reliance on general public support for 
integration. Chapter 2 of this project reveals that this general support among citizens is on 
the decline. The trend began with the Maastricht Treaty and dropped from its all-time 
high of 71 percent immediately prior to the treaty in 1991 to 53 percent by 2009 when the 
Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. This offers empirical evidence that confirms 
speculations in the literature of declining permissive consensus, while extending the 
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timeline beyond the TCE. I conclude on RQ1 that permissive consensus has come to an 
end. 
RQ2 measures whether negative voting on the TCE and the subsequent ToL 
reflects opposition to further integration in all 27 members or solely in those countries 
that experienced failed referenda. My findings reveal that only in Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland and the UK are citizens actually opposed to the elements contained in the TCE 
(and the substantively similar ToL). The remaining member states support the treaties‟ 
deepening changes at rates higher than 50 percent. I can conclude with confidence from 
this analysis that discontent with the ToL is not a general phenomenon across all member 
states. Rather it ranges from very low (21 percent opposition in Lithuania) to very high 
discontent (68 percent opposition in Sweden), the aggregate rate of support is 64.5 
percent. I have not yet determined an explanation for the presence of these outliers 
among my empirical findings but will address this issue in future research. 
In those countries that voted against the TCE or the ToL, I find that support in all 
cases is above 55 percent. Had citizens been voting on the content of the treaty in these 
countries they would not have encountered such ratification issues. I propose therefore 
that the rejection of these treaties was grounded in opposition to some other EU issue, 
which leads my analysis into the third question.  
There are varying conclusions in the literature on the reasons why citizens 
rejected the TCE and ToL when given the chance to vote. My analysis thus seeks to 
determine, what citizens were discontent with when they opposed deepening. Chapter 3 
evaluates the many possible forms of EU-building to which citizens may have been 
opposed and I find that greatest contention is on the question of future enlargement. For 
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all EU groups combined, support for enlargement is only 46.6 percent; lower than any 
other type of integration. Support for enlargement is lowest in EU6 (36.1 percent in 
favor) and EU9 (42.7 percent in favor) enlargement groups.  This is further supported by 
calculating, for those citizens who are against an EU constitution, what else they oppose. 
Results reveal that discontent with the treaty is most likely affected by discontent with 
enlargement where 64.2 percent of those who are anti-constitutional treaty are also 
against EU widening. The answer to RQ3 is therefore, that the nature of citizen discontent 
in the EU can be largely described as aversion to further widening. 
 Based on my finding that discontent is highest on EU enlargement, I sought to 
investigate what motivates such opposition. Most literature investigates discontent with 
the EU in general and therefore I set out to determine what underlies the formation of 
citizens‟ opinions on the various forms of integration. When comparing common theories 
of support for regional integration, I find that regardless of the type of integration, the 
level of European identity plays the most important role in influencing EU support. The 
finding calls into question the most common conclusion found in the literature which is 
that opinion is driven by utilitarian calculations based on levels of human and financial 
capital. 
Although the analysis reveals that values and identity explain more variation in 
the degree of support than other factors (see Figure 4.1), it did not allow for investigation 
of which values are most important in driving opinion on integration. I reproduced the 
same investigation, therefore, using the European Values Study which offers a multitude 
of value dimensions from which to draw explanatory factors. Values are a novel 
explanation for public support for integration which has been mentioned by the literature 
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yet not ever empirically tested. I conduct the analysis on the question of enlargement 
which is the most contentious of integration forms. Doing so, I further confirm that public 
opinion, across all 27 member states and within the three enlargement groups, is not 
influenced foremost by utilitarian calculations. 
In response to RQ4 therefore, although there are large variations based on 
enlargement group (i.e. EU6, EU9, EU12, or EU27), I found that European identity at the 
aggregate level is the most important factor in determining attitudes toward EU 
enlargement, followed closely by trust in government (at the national and supranational 
levels), and values of tolerance (especially acceptance of immigrants). When enlargement 
groups are observed in isolation of each other I find that identity remains important in 
EU9 member states but is superseded in the EU12 by degree of support for national 
government and by orientations toward government organizations in EU6. I have thus 
successfully confirmed that the socio-cultural explanation of values underlying individual 
decision-making in the EU is an important alternative (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4) to popular 
theories of support for integration. 
 
Implications  
This study has served to contest many of the varying findings on public opinion in the 
EU. The first of these is the tendency to focus solely on the EU in general when 
examining public opinion or to assume citizens were opposed to a constitution when 
voting against the TCE and ToL in referenda. Considering the findings of RQ3 that 
opposition in the Union is mainly to enlargement, implications are both theoretical and 
practical. The theoretical implication is to identify the gap in public opinion literature 
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where a distinction between different types of integration (i.e. deepening versus 
widening) is being largely overlooked. Practically, based on widespread opposition to 
enlargement, pro-EU elites may consider limiting the growth of the EU to encourage 
higher public support for deepening. In turn, it is plausible that the launch of accession 
talks with Macedonia in March 2012 and the scheduled membership of Croatia in 2013 
will negatively impact public opinion even further in coming years. 
In addition to an exhaustive study of all explanatory factors found in the literature, 
this research also investigates the role of values in forming public opinion on 
enlargement. The implications of this observation are again twofold. First, my findings 
build on existing theories of support for regional integration, suggesting that factors 
driving integration support are not socio-economic but socio-cultural in nature. Second, 
in practice in order for the Union to successfully endure it will be necessary for pro-EU 
elites to become more attentive to this diversity in values within the EU to in turn 
accommodate the varying preferences that emerge. Understanding the disparity in 
preferences is crucial in order for elites to make informed and representative decisions for 
the future deepening of European integration. 
With increased value diversity, actions taken unanimously by pro-European elites 
are less likely to reflect the interests of all citizens. Decision-making should consider 
underlying socio-cultural characteristics of citizens by focusing on identity and trust at 
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Caveats and Future Research 
My first caveat is that this study limits the analysis to observations across enlargement 
groups (EU6, EU9, and EU12) commonly used in the literature, except where variation in 
support for the ToL was examined by country (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Observation of 
variation within additional country groups and at the individual state level was not 
possible in this study as interpretations would be extensive and far beyond the scope of 
this work. 
A more extensive study that will address my first caveat will include discussion of 
the variation in countries individually (e.g. why support for deepening is lowest in 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and the UK) and across groups (based on Eurozone 
membership, north-south geographical position, state left-right placement, population 
size, size of the welfare state, and EU budget contributions). 
The second caveat of my research concerns my focus in the RQ4 EVS Analysis on 
enlargement only.  To establish generalizability of my findings across different types of 
integration (both enlargement and deepening), I would have to combine two datasets (i.e. 
the multiple EBs and the EVS). Doing so entails that my observations drop to only 27 
cases which affects my ability to make predictions with any statistical significance. 
In response to the second caveat, although I cannot collect additional data, it 
would be possible to conduct the analysis at the aggregate level by grouping variables 
based on their averages at the sub-regional level (i.e. component units within the member 
states) rather than at the state level. In doing so I could combine the Eurobarometer and 
European Values Study and replicate the RQ4 analyses providing for the creation of a 
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hierarchy of factors that can also explain support for the EU in general and deepening 
(treaty changes and the Euro). 
The third caveat to this study lies in the technique used for the creation of value 
dimensions (e.g. religious values, political values, etc.) and is problematic in two ways. 
First, the exploratory factor analysis creates value dimensions that are not grounded in 
theory, it solely groups values based on their propensity to vary with each other (for 
instance: within political values there is a tendency for individuals to respond similarly to 
both questions whether politics are important in their life and if they are interested in 
politics). The questions are not grouped together because intuitively it makes sense or 
because the literature has suggested that they are measuring similar things. Instead, the 
technique groups these items together through analysis of their common variation. 
The second limitation of the exploratory factor analysis is that it ignores any 
tendency for value groupings to have interacting effects on support for integration. This 
interaction effect may not be captured by including all dimensions separately in the same 
regression. For instance there may be a link between orientations toward government 
organizations and orientations toward immigrants (e.g. it is plausible that lack of 
confidence in government organizations does not alone influence support for the EU but 
rather that individuals with low confidence in government organizations and low 
tolerance of immigration are less supportive of integration). 
The two issues within the third caveat will also be remedied in future analysis. 
The first solution does not draw theoretical expectations from existing literature as very 
little research has been done to predict what kind of values contribute to greater 
integration support. Instead, I will strengthen my findings by repeating the same analysis 
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in different time periods (prior to and post 2006-2009), within and across country groups 
(single countries and groups such as Eurozone, net contributors, etc.), and in different 
contexts of regional integration (e.g. the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Doing so 
will also contribute to the gap in the theoretical literature. 
I will address the second limitation within caveat three in future analyses by 
conducting a log linear analysis. Such an analysis offers insight into the power of the 
interaction between independent variables when explaining variation on the dependent 
variable. The technique identifies what factors explain variation on the DV alone and 
which require the presence of a certain response on another variable to illicit variation in 
the DV (e.g. individual is pro-EU when pro-governmental organization alone or also 
tolerant of immigration). This will then permit me to create new variables accounting for 
the interaction between factors, in turn reducing the number of variables in the regression 
and contributing to greater parsimony. 
The fourth caveat of this research is reliance solely on individual values rather 
than value differences between individuals. In other words, I investigate here the role of 
level of religiosity in determining support for the EU, rather than the role of simply 
having a different level of religiosity from someone else in the Union. 
This will be addressed in future analysis by observing the distance between 
groups. Such an analysis will be conducted by establishing, for each survey respondent, 
the distance between their personal values on different dimensions and average citizen 
values on each of those same dimensions at different levels. For instance, new variables 
would be created by calculating the difference between one individual‟s score on their 
level of religiosity (e.g. highly religious) and the average score of all citizens in that 
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individual‟s country (e.g. overall not at all religious). The same comparison can be made 
between the individual and the average score of those in different country groups (EU6, 
large welfare states, etc.), and the average of all EU27 citizens. 
The final caveat concerns the limitation of my timeline to the 2006-2009 timeline, 
(the context of the Treaty of Lisbon). I am interested in extending this timeline to 
determine whether my findings are generalizable across time, thus serving to improve the 
robustness of my conclusions and ultimately making a significant contribution to the 
integration support theory literature 
I will address this final caveat by reproducing the same analyses from RQ3 and 
RQ4 in different contexts. For instance, a strong empirical test of the validity and strength 
of my conclusions will be to test the socio-cultural explanation in the context of a purely 
economic treaty (i.e. the European Stability Mechanism currently being ratified). This 
investigation will permit me to observe whether the socio-cultural explanation holds in a 
context where one would intuitively expect individual calculations to be entirely directed 
by economic factors along (such as human and financial capital). 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A – Values that Define European Identity 
 
1. Outlooks toward religion (not important)  0.761***
2. Orientations toward religious ceremonies (not important) -0.36
3. Orientations toward afterlife (do not believe) -0.71
4. Orientations toward institutions (not confident) -0.14
5. Orientations toward government organizations (not confident) -0.502***
6. Orientations toward the EU (no fear)  0.0819**
7. Orientations toward work (not important)  0.112
8. Workplace motivations (not important) -0.18
9. Orientations toward immigrants (permissive)  0.146***
10. Orientations toward marginalized groups (unconcerned)  0.117
11. Orientations toward neighbors (unconcerned) -0.09
12. Civil Permissiveness (permissive)  0.0402
13. Moral Permissiveness (permissive)  0.00111
14. Orientations toward abortion (non-permissive)  0.0583
15. Orientations children (not important) -0.01
16. Sociocultural orientations toward marriage (heterogeneity)  0.226
17. Interpersonal orientations toward marriage(non-reciprocal) -0.08
18.  Orientations toward gender roles (inequality) -0.05
19.  Orientations toward women and work (women should work) -0.15
20. Orientations toward civil activism (never) -0.15
21. Orientations toward Democracy (democracy works) -0.004
22. Orientations toward politics (not important) -0.19
23. Orientations toward leisure (not important) -0.39
N 4,577
Chi2(23)=144.17 p<0.001
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: European Values Study 2008
Explaining What it Means to be "European" Across Member States
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)
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Appendix C – EVS Questions for Value Dimensions 
 
Religious values Orientations toward work
1. Outlooks toward religion (not important) 7. Orientations toward work (not important)
v129 how important is God in your life (Q36) v96 work comes always first (Q18E)
v132 how often do you pray to God outside religious services (Q39) v95 work is a duty towards society (Q18D)
v119 do you believe in: God (Q30A) v94 people turn lazy not working (Q18C)
v114 are you a religious person (Q28) v92 job needed to develop talents (Q18A)
v130 do you get comfort and strength from religion (Q37) v93 humiliating receiving money without working (Q18B)
v6 how important in your life: religion (Q1F) 8. Workplace motivations (not important)
v120 do you believe in: life after death (Q30B) v74 important in a job: use initiative (Q14F)
v109 how often attend religious services (Q25) v82 important in a job: learning new skills (Q14N)
v205 how much confidence in: church (Q63A) v84 important in a job: have a say (Q14P)
v125 which statement closest to your beliefs (Q32) v76 important in a job: generous holidays (Q14H)
v131 do you take moments of prayer/meditation (Q38) v71 important in a job: not too much pressure (Q14C)
v123 do you believe in: sin (Q30E) v75 important in a job: useful for society (Q14G)
v105 do you belong to a religious denomination (Q23) v79 important in a job: responsible job (Q14K)
v128 only one true religion or no religion offers any truths (Q35) v81 important in a job: meeting abilities (Q14M)
v127 how spiritual are you (Q34) v78 important in a job: achieving something (Q14J)
v178 learn children at home: religious faith (Q52I) v83 important in a job: family friendly (Q14O)
2. Orientations toward religious ceremonies (not important) v85 important in a job: people treated equally (Q14Q)
v111 religious service important: birth (Q27A) v77 important in a job: meeting people (Q14I)
v112 religious service important: marriage (Q27B) v80 important in a job: interesting job (Q14L)
v113 religious service important: death (Q27C) v70 important in a job: pleasant people (Q14B)
3. Orientations toward afterlife (do not believe)
v121 do you believe in: hell (Q30C)
v122 do you believe in: heaven (Q30D) Tolerance Values
9. Orientations toward immigrants (permissive)
v272 immigrants will become a threat to society (Q78E)
Orientation toward Institutions v271 immigrants are a strain on welfare system (Q78D)
4. Orientations toward institutions (not confident) v270 immigrants increase crime problems (Q78C)
v221 how much confidence in: political parties (Q63Q) v268 immigrants take away jobs from [nationality] (Q78A)
v211 how much confidence in: parliament (Q63G) v269 immigrants undermine countrys cultural life (Q78B)
v222 how much confidence in: government (Q63R) v275 immigrants living in your country: there are too many (Q79B)
v212 how much confidence in: civil service (Q63H) v102 jobs are scarce: giving...(nation) priority (Q21A)
v218 how much confidence in: justice system (Q63N) 10. Orientations toward marginalized groups (unconcerned)
v213 how much confidence in: social security system (Q63I) v293 are you concerned with living conditions of: sick and disabled (Q84D)
v217 how much confidence in: health care system (Q63M) v294 are you concerned with living conditions of: poor children (Q84E)
v210 how much confidence in: the police (Q63F) v290 are you concerned with living conditions of: elderly people (Q84A)
v207 how much confidence in: education system (Q63C) v291 are you concerned with living conditions of: unemployed people (Q84B)
v206 how much confidence in: armed forces (Q63B) v292 are you concerned with living conditions of: immigrants (Q84C)
v209 how much confidence in: trade unions (Q63E) 11. Orientations toward neighbors (unconcerned)
v219 how much confidence in: major companies (Q63O) v286 are you concerned with living conditions of: people own region (Q83C)
v220 how much confidence in: environmental organizations (Q63P) v287 are you concerned with living conditions of: fellow countrymen (Q83D)
v208 how much confidence in: the press (Q63D) v288 are you concerned with living conditions of: europeans (Q83E)
5. Orientations toward government organizations (not confident)
v285 are you concerned with living conditions of: people neighbourhood (Q83B)
v215 how much confidence in: NATO (Q63K) v289 are you concerned with living conditions of: humankind (Q83F)
v216 how much confidence in: united nations organisation (Q63L)
v214 how much confidence in: european union (Q63J)
Value Dimensions of the 2008 European Values Study
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Moral and Ethical Values Political Values
12. Civil Permissiveness (permissive) 20. Orientations toward civil activism (never)
v234 do you justify: cheating on tax (Q68B) v189 attending lawful demonstrations (Q55C)
v238 do you justify: adultery (Q68F) v190 joining unofficial strikes (Q55D)
v239 do you justify: accepting a bribe (Q68G) v188 joining in boycotts (Q55B)
v245 do you justify: paying cash to avoid taxes (Q68M) v187 signing a petition (Q55A)
v237 do you justify: lying in own interest (Q68E) v191 occupying buildings/factories (Q55E)
v236 do you justify: taking soft drugs (Q68D) 21. Orientations toward Democracy (democracy works)
v247 do you justify: avoiding fare public transport (Q68O) v231 democracy: is indecisive (Q67C)
v233 do you justify: claiming state benefits (Q68A) v232 democracy: cannot maintain order (Q67D)
v235 do you justify: joyriding (Q68C) v230 democracy: causes bad economy (Q67B)
13. Moral Permissiveness (permissive) 22. Orientations toward politics (not important)
v240 do you justify: homosexuality (Q68H) v5 how important in your life: politics (Q1E)
v242 do you justify: divorce (Q68J) v186 how interested are you in politics (Q54)
v243 do you justify: euthanasia (Q68K)
v246 do you justify: having casual sex (Q68N)
v251 do you justify: invitro fertilization (Q68S) Postmodern Values
v250 do you justify: manipulation food (Q68R) 23. Orientations toward leisure (not important)
v252 do you justify: death penalty (Q68T) v98 leisure time: relaxing (Q19B)
v249 do you justify: experiments human embryos (Q68Q) v100 leisure time: learning something new (Q19D)
v248 do you justify: prostitution (Q68P) v99 leisure time: doing as I want (Q19C)
v244 do you justify: suicide (Q68L) v97 leisure time: meeting nice people (Q19A)
14. Orientations toward abortion (non-permissive) v4 how important in your life: leisure time (Q1D)
v184 abortion if woman not married approve/disapprove (Q53A)
v185 abortion if couple doesnt want more children approve/disapprove (Q53B)
v241 do you justify: abortion (Q68I)
Family Values
15. Orientations children (not important)
v152 men need children in order to be fulfilled (Q47A)
v149 women need children in order to be fulfilled (Q44)
v156 duty towards society to have children (Q47E)
v153 long-term relationship necessary to be happy (Q47B)
v145 important in marriage: children (Q42J)
v158 It is childs duty to take care of ill parent (Q47G)
v148 children need both parents to grow up happily (Q43)
16. Sociocultural orientations toward marriage (heterogeneity)
v139 important in marriage: shared religious beliefs (Q42D)
v138 important in marriage: same social background (Q42C)
v137 important in marriage: adequate income (Q42B)
v140 important in marriage: good housing (Q42E)
v141 important in marriage: agreement on politics (Q42F)
17. Interpersonal orientations toward marriage(non-reciprocal)
v143 important in marriage: happy sexual relationship (Q42H)
v144 important in marriage: share household chores (Q42I)
v146 important in marriage: discuss problems (Q42K)
v142 important in marriage: live apart from in-laws (Q42G)
v147 important in marriage: time for friends and personal hobbies (Q42L)
18.  Orientations toward gender roles (inequality)
v166 men should take the same responsibility for home and children (Q48H)
v165 fathers as well suited to look after children as mothers (Q48G)
v164 husband+wife contribute to household income (Q48F)
v159 working mother warm relationship with children (Q48A)
v163 job best way for independence women (Q48E)
v157 people should decide themselves to have children (Q47F)
19.  Orientations toward women and work (women should work)
v160 pre-school child suffers with working mother (Q48B)
v161 women really want home and children (Q48C)
v162 being housewife as fulfilling as paid job (Q48D)
Value Dimensions of the 2008 European Values Study continued…
141 
Appendices    
Appendix D – EB Analysis for Integration Widening – Control Variables 
EU27 EU6 EU9 EU12
Control Variables
Age -0.00540*** -0.00532** -0.00677*** -0.00386*
Female -0.160*** -0.182*** -0.220*** -0.124***
Retired  0.0114  0.25  0.0842 -0.137
Student  0.0766  0.493***  0.19 -0.221*
Farmer -0.123 -0.199 -0.176 -0.0673
Homemaker -0.0119  0.204  0.132 -0.207
Small Welfare State -0.443*** -0.823***
Large Welfare State -0.223**  0.663*** -0.0197
North -0.284*** -0.0189  0.370***
Micro State -0.713***
Small State  0.0164  0.566***
Medium State  0.505***
Large State -0.236*** -0.427***
Left State  0.202** 1.182***  0.658***










Sweden  0.591***  1.039***
Cyprus  0.376***
Czech Republic  0.00863
Estonia -0.117






Romania -0.1  0.0155
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
EB Analysis - Explaining Citizen Discontent with EU Widening Across Member 
States
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)-Control Variables
Model 1
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate 
Change, March-May 2008 
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Appendix E – EB Analysis for EU in General 
EU27 EU6 EU9 EU12
Socio-Economic Explanations
Party Affiliation
Left -0.0202  0.0844* -0.0061 -0.137***
Right  0.108***  0.0417  0.0914**  0.124***
Utilitarian Theory
Low Financial Capital -0.249*** -0.0937* -0.235*** -0.330***
High Financial Capital  0.191***  0.190***  0.196***  0.187***
High Education  0.191***  0.178***  0.163***  0.221***
Low Education -0.159*** -0.198*** -0.165*** -0.137***
Professional  0.00533  0.0362  0.125 -0.0875
Manual Worker -0.114*** -0.182*** -0.0961* -0.0678
Unemployed -0.0853* -0.234** -0.153*  0.0337
Entrepreneur -0.0109 -0.0442 -0.00531  0.0313
Support for Government
Support Governing Party  0.663***  0.713***  0.699***  0.547***
Socio-Cultural Explanations
Cognitive Mobilization Theory
Never Discuss Politics -0.150*** -0.133*** -0.168*** -0.148***
Frequently Discuss Politics  0.0678**  0.0692  0.0759*  0.0633
Low Knowledge  0.00511  0.0168 -0.0073  0.0299
Political Values Theory
Materialist  0.00445 -0.012  0.0119  0.069
Post Materialist  0.0614***  0.0768*  0.0236  0.0539*
Values
The Rule of Law  0.160***  0.135**  0.117**  0.241***
Respect for Human Life  0.0728***  0.0439  0.0978**  0.0773*
Human Rights  0.162***  0.131**  0.178***  0.182***
Individual Freedom  0.128***  0.128**  0.117**  0.159***
Democracy  0.207***  0.170***  0.205***  0.244***
Peace  0.0898***  0.0728  0.0762*  0.129***
Equality  0.0571*  0.00288  0.0761*  0.0803*
Solidarity  0.157***  0.224***  0.115**  0.171***
Tolerance  0.162***  0.142**  0.218***  0.169***
Religion -0.00389 -0.00157  0.0453 -0.0237
Self Fulfilment  0.114***  0.144**  0.0931*  0.143**
Respect for Other Cultures  0.201***  0.148**  0.287***  0.172**
Identity
European  0.484***  0.542***  0.497***  0.433***
Not European -0.629*** -0.560*** -0.651*** -0.626***
N 21,374 5,315 7,766 7,427
Adj. R
2
0.285 0.275 0.315 0.265
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate 
Change, March'-May 2008 
EB Analysis - Explaining Citizen Discontent with the EU in General
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)
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EU27 EU6 EU9 EU12
Control Variables
Age -0.00458*** -0.00252 -0.00316** -0.00651***
Female -0.140*** -0.126*** -0.202*** -0.0897**
Retired  0.105  0.272*  0.113  0.043
Student  0.340***  0.564***  0.454***  0.154*
Farmer  0.236***  0.495*  0.194  0.172
Homemaker  0.219***  0.354***  0.285**  0.101
Small Welfare State -0.257*** -0.293**
Large Welfare State -0.140*  0.140*  0.101
North -0.102**  0.379***  0.0962
Micro State -0.261***
Small State -0.130*  0.0361
Medium State  0.841***
Large State -0.387*** -0.428***
Left State -0.158**  0.232**  0.494***
Net Contributor -0.182**  0.0897 -0.945*** -0.299***
Belgium  0.158*
Germany  0.242*** -0.138
Greece  0.0286






Sweden -0.516***  0.145*
Cyprus -0.145









* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate 
Change, March'-May 2008 
EB Analysis - Explaining Citizen Discontent with the EU in General
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)
Control Variables
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Appendix F – EB Analysis for Institutions 
 
EU27 EU6 EU9 EU12
Socio-Economic Explanations
Party Affiliation
Left -0.0234  0.0679 -0.021 -0.0551
Right  0.0838***  0.0517  0.0491  0.0963**
Utilitarian Theory
Low Financial Capital -0.242*** -0.151** -0.305*** -0.237***
High Financial Capital  0.0449*  0.0373  0.0303  0.0624
High Education  0.0781***  0.0966*  0.00801  0.114**
Low Education -0.108*** -0.0739 -0.193*** -0.0784
Professional  0.0443 -0.0568  0.00994  0.0608
Manual Worker -0.0754*  0.0742 -0.0505 -0.173***
Unemployed -0.0466 -0.0987  0.0186 -0.0973
Entrepreneur  0.00236 -0.0244  0.0484 -0.0173
Support for Government
Support Governing Party  0.701***  0.814***  0.791***  0.487***
Socio-Cultural Explanations
Cognitive Mobilization Theory
Never Discuss Politics -0.223*** -0.162*** -0.222*** -0.281***
Frequently Discuss Politics  0.00538 -0.00778 -0.0111  0.0604
Low Knowledge  0.123***  0.189***  0.0978**  0.0838*
Political Values Theory
Materialist  0.127***  0.205***  0.0473  0.180**
Post Materialist  0.111***  0.0779*  0.125***  0.0854**
Values
The Rule of Law  0.143***  0.140*  0.0653  0.198***
Respect for Human Life  0.111***  0.144**  0.0666  0.124**
Human Rights  0.214***  0.201***  0.168***  0.281***
Individual Freedom  0.121***  0.0954  0.112**  0.142**
Democracy  0.238***  0.190***  0.192***  0.321***
Peace  0.120***  0.129**  0.0786*  0.140***
Equality  0.121***  0.138**  0.0896*  0.142**
Solidarity  0.121***  0.178***  0.0466  0.145**
Tolerance  0.158***  0.189***  0.146***  0.164***
Religion -0.0136  0.0412  0.0301 -0.0418
Self Fulfilment  0.112***  0.134*  0.1  0.103
Respect for Other Cultures  0.161***  0.144*  0.160**  0.131*
Identity
European  0.409***  0.443***  0.378***  0.406***
Not European -0.573*** -0.554*** -0.605*** -0.554***
N 21,374 5,315 7,766 7,427
Adj. R
2
0.202 0.202 0.255 0.153
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate 
Change, March'-May 2008 
EB Analysis - Explaining the Citizen Discontent with EU Institutions
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)
145 
Appendices    
EU27 EU6 EU9 EU12
Control Variables
Age -0.00236**  0.000486 -0.00103 -0.00513***
Female -0.0605*** -0.0229 -0.0770** -0.0552
Retired  0.00308  0.0934 -0.0808  0.0643
Student  0.241***  0.464***  0.156  0.149
Farmer  0.0318  0.16  0.0234 -0.0293
Homemaker  0.0683  0.000809 -0.018  0.163
Small Welfare State -0.0801  0.0134
Large Welfare State -0.112  0.411***  0.159**
North -0.408*** -0.0503 -0.125
Micro State -0.357***
Small State -0.0237  0.193*
Medium State  0.634***
Large State -0.292*** -0.452***
Left State -0.488***  0.887***  0.0941
Net Contributor  0.249** -0.0771 -0.854***  0.230*
Belgium  0.197**
Germany  0.268*** -1.088***
Greece  0.457***





Portugal  0.566***  0.105
Sweden -0.584***  0.00662
Cyprus -0.0218
Czech Republic  0.657***
Estonia -0.258***
Hungary  0.210** -0.0429
Latvia -0.187* -0.444***





* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate 
Change, March'-May 2008 
EB Analysis - Explaining the Citizen Discontent with EU Institutions
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)
Control Variables
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Appendix G – EB Analysis for Integration Deepening 
 
EU27 EU6 EU9 EU12
Socio-Economic Explanations
Party Affiliation
Left -0.0645*** -0.0534** -0.0444* -0.0867***
Right -0.0142 -0.0321  0.00177 -0.0265
Utilitarian Theory
Low Financial Capital -0.0859*** -0.0227 -0.132*** -0.0749***
High Financial Capital  0.0450***  0.0273  0.0744**  0.0304
High Education  0.0543***  0.113***  0.0286  0.0442*
Low Education -0.0707*** -0.00397 -0.107*** -0.0740**
Professional -0.00985 -0.051  0.0502 -0.0388
Manual Worker -0.0298 -0.0277 -0.0176 -0.031
Unemployed  0.0354 -0.0601  0.0398  0.0692*
Entrepreneur  0.00551  0.0317  0.0111 -0.0183
Support for Government
Support Governing Party  0.149***  0.108***  0.195***  0.108***
Socio-Cultural Explanations
Cognitive Mobilization Theory
Never Discuss Politics -0.121*** -0.178*** -0.106*** -0.101***
Frequently Discuss Politics -0.0187  0.00115 -0.0266 -0.0121
Low Knowledge  0.0349**  0.0386  0.0343  0.0331
Political Values Theory
Materialist  0.0966***  0.0621*  0.119***  0.124***
Post Materialist  0.0416***  0.0629**  0.0469*  0.0157
Values
The Rule of Law  0.155***  0.233***  0.125***  0.153***
Respect for Human Life  0.122***  0.146***  0.151***  0.0876***
Human Rights  0.154***  0.191***  0.162***  0.141***
Individual Freedom  0.151***  0.188***  0.174***  0.121***
Democracy  0.149***  0.209***  0.122***  0.154***
Peace  0.134***  0.198***  0.105***  0.127***
Equality  0.126***  0.184***  0.131***  0.0888***
Solidarity  0.0894***  0.161***  0.0499  0.0880**
Tolerance  0.149***  0.142***  0.184***  0.137***
Religion  0.0454*  0.0578  0.0784*  0.0284
Self Fulfilment  0.127***  0.173***  0.116***  0.116***
Respect for Other Cultures  0.168***  0.171***  0.240***  0.102**
Identity
European  0.135***  0.104***  0.194***  0.106***
Not European -0.404*** -0.431*** -0.442*** -0.326***
N 21,374 5,315 7,766 7,427
Adj. R
2
0.154 0.127 0.148 0.102
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate 
Change, March'-May 2008 
EB Analysis - Explaining Citizen Discontent with EU Deepening 
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)
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EU27 EU6 EU9 EU12
Control Variables
Age -0.000218  0.00228* -0.000508 -0.00121
Female -0.0651*** -0.0639*** -0.0859*** -0.0420**
Retired -0.0366  0.0262 -0.0324 -0.0618
Student -0.0516  0.128* -0.0429 -0.122**
Farmer -0.0135  0.141 -0.0162 -0.0627
Homemaker -0.0262  0.0497 -0.0408 -0.0335
Small Welfare State -0.062 -0.441***
Large Welfare State -0.190***  0.125***  0.0173
North -0.0872*** -0.390***  0.339***
Micro State -0.429***
Small State -0.0354  0.476***
Medium State -0.0376
Large State -0.284*** -0.188***
Left State -0.459***  0.147** -0.0137
Net Contributor  0.348***  0.0962* -0.122** 0.537***
Belgium -0.077










Czech Republic  0.492***
Estonia -0.109***
Hungary  0.0384 -0.482***
Latvia  0.113** -0.414***





* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate 
Change, March'-May 2008 
EB Analysis - Explaining Citizen Discontent with EU Deepening 
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification)
Control Variables
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Appendix H – Comparing Predictions of EB and EVS Analyses 
EB Analysis EVS Analysis
Cognitive Mobilization Theory
Never Discuss Politics -0.174*** -0.123**
Frequently Discuss Politics -0.00658  0.100*
Low Knowledge  0.162***
Political Values Theory
Materialist -0.137*** -0.138
Post Materialist  0.123***  0.125
Party Affiliation
Left  0.108***  0.312***
Right -0.101*** -0.232***
Utilitarian Theory
Low Financial Capital -0.155***
High Financial Capital  0.0716**  0.0133
High Education  0.140***  0.249***
Low Education -0.124*** -0.120**
Professional -0.0184
Manual Worker -0.05
Unemployed  0.0264 -0.180*
Entrepreneur -0.0545
Support for Government
Support Governing Party  0.309***  0.431***
Identity
European  0.341***  0.667***
Not European -0.545***




 0.155  0.117
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Comparing Analyses - Examining the Comparability of the Eurobarometer and the 
European Values Study on EU Widening
Sources:
European Values Study 2008
Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March-
May 2008 
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EU27 EU6 EU9 EU12
Control Variables
Age -0.00972*** -0.00772 -0.0106* -0.00961*
Female -0.147** -0.0168 -0.113 -0.262**
Retired -0.00581  0.0627 -0.0274  0.00766
Student 0.165  0.171 0.504  0.00274
Homemaker -0.152 -0.129 -0.538**  0.126
Small Welfare State -0.0511 -0.890***
Large Welfare State -0.0118 -0.406*
North -0.288* -0.887*** -0.598*
Small State  0.576*  0.804*** 0.243  0.173
Medium State  0.930***  0.765*
Large State  0.340*
Left State -0.114  0.527* 0.208  0.967***
Net Contributor -0.937***  0.667*
Belgium  0.0709
Germany  0.268  0.461






Austria -0.115  0.286
Portugal -0.878**  0.00866
Sweden -0.0277  0.486**
Cyprus  1.504***







Bulgaria  0.670**  0.486
Romania  0.753***  0.685**
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: European Values Study 2008
EVS Analysis - Explaining the Degree of Citizen Discontent with EU Widening Across Member States
2008 (during ToL Negotiation and Ratification) - Control Variables
